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ABSTRACT 
 
DAN AMIRAM: Debt Contracts and Loss Given Default 
(Under the direction of Robert M. Bushman and Wayne R. Landsman) 
 
 
 This study explores how accounting information available to lenders at the 
contracting date shapes debt contracts by facilitating lenders’ assessment of loss given 
default (LGD). LGD, defined as the percentage loss experienced per $1 of debt if default 
occurs, is closely related to the notion of liquidation value which is central to debt 
contracting theories. LGD, together with probability of default, determines expected credit 
loss and as such is a critical component of debt contract design. While a large literature 
examines probability of default, much less is known about the impact of expected LGD on 
contract design and the information set relevant to lenders in assessing LGD at debt 
origination. Using a sample of defaulted bonds, I find that a select set of accounting measures 
available at contract initiation, which is 47 months on average before the default event in my 
sample, possess significant power for predicting actual creditor losses at the subsequent 
default date. I then exploit this prediction model to construct an accounting-based measure of 
expected LGD for a large sample of bond issuances. I find that a one standard deviation 
increase in this measure is associated with a 58 basis point increase in the issuance date 
interest rate spread, incremental to probability of default. The positive relation between 
expected LGD and spread is higher when probability of default and managerial entrenchment 
are higher. Expected LGD is also associated with an increased probability of the debt being 
secured, having shorter debt maturity, and having a smaller debt size. These relations also 
hold for a sample of private loan issuances after controlling for financial covenant strictness, 
where I also find that higher expected LGD is associated with stricter financial covenants. 
Moreover, I find evidence that accounting systems that provide more precise information 
about equity value also provide more precise information about LGD, where the opposite 
holds for more conservative accounting. 
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1. Introduction 
This study explores how accounting information that is available to lenders at the 
contracting date shapes the design of debt contracts. I posit that an important channel through 
which accounting information affects contracts is by facilitating lenders’ assessment of loss given 
default (LGD). LGD, defined as the percentage loss lenders experience from $1 of outstanding 
principal in a case of default, is closely related to the notion of liquidation value and is a critical 
component of credit risk and debt contracting theories.1  Despite the theoretical importance of 
LGD, there is little empirical evidence on its effects on debt contracts.  Even rarer is evidence 
regarding how information available to lenders at the contracting date shapes their expectations 
about LGD and, in turn, affects debt contract terms.  
 In this study I exploit a dataset of loss given default realizations to estimate a prediction 
model based on financial accounting information available to lenders at the loan contracting date. I 
then use this model to study the impact of accounting-based LGD expectations on the design of 
debt contracts. Specifically, for a sample of defaulted debt instruments, I first examine the extent to 
which financial accounting information available prior to the contracting date predicts lenders’ 
losses in cases where default occurs. Using the LGD prediction model developed in the first step, I 
generate an accounting-based measure of expected LGD at loan initiation dates for a large sample 
of non-defaulted borrowing firms. I then examine whether expected loss given default affects key 
terms of the debt contract such as interest rate spread, maturity, security and debt size, and also 
when expected loss given default has stronger effects on lenders. I further examine how cross-
                                               
1 In other words, LGD is the amount that lenders cannot recover from $1 of debt, which implies that LGD is one minus 
the recovery rate on a debt instrument. The following example illustrates the underlying construct behind LGD. A 
lender invested $100 in a firm. The firm defaulted on the debt and liquidated as a consequence. The lender received $20 out 
of the liquidation proceeds. The lender thus recovered 20% of the loan and had a loss given default of 80%.   
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sectional differences in characteristics of firms’ accounting information affect the extent to which 
lenders use the information about loss given default when they initiate the debt contract.  
According to credit risk theory, the price and terms of risky debt depends directly on 
lenders’ assessments of expected losses from the instrument. Expected credit loss is generally 
conceptualized as the product of the probability of default and expected loss given default. 
Although a substantial body of  research focuses on predicting and evaluating the effects of default 
probabilities, only recently, as necessary data have became available, has research started to 
investigate determinates and consequences of LGD. In addition, LGD is intimately related to a 
firm’s liquidation value, where higher liquidation value implies lower LGD. Liquidation value is 
central to many debt contracting theories, since the optimal debt contract depends on how costly it 
is for lenders to liquidate the borrower’s assets. Higher liquidation values alleviate some of the 
lenders’ concerns about incentive conflicts they have with borrowers (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; 
Hart and Moore, 1994).  
Although these arguments suggest that LGD is important to lenders, there are reasons why 
firm-specific information about LGD may not be useful for debt contracting. For example, some 
studies suggest that firm-specific LGD is diversifiable (Altman, 2009). In addition, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that lenders do not use firm-specific information to estimate LGD (Gupton and 
Stein, 2005). Moreover, accounting information available to lenders at the date of the contract (47 
months on average before the default date in my sample) may not have power for predicting LGD. 
Despite its theoretical importance, there is lack of empirical evidence on the relation between LGD 
and debt contract terms.2 Of particular interest to this study is the fact that little documented 
evidence exists regarding how lenders collect, assess and use information on LGD and liquidation 
value at the contract date.  
                                               
2 See discussion on the lack of empirical evidence on the effects of liquidation value and collateral on debt contracts in 
Benmelech et al. (2005) and Benmelech and Bergman (2009). These papers are also notable exceptions in the literature 
and provide empirical evidence on this question. See further elaboration of these papers in section 2 below.  
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This study seeks to provide direct evidence on the link between firm-specific information, 
LGD and debt contract characteristics such as credit spread, maturity, size and security. A key 
source of firm-specific information available to lenders at the contract decision date is accounting 
information from the borrower’s financial statements (Tirole, 2007; Standard and Poor’s, 2009). I 
conjecture that publicly available financial statement information available to lenders at the 
contracting date is useful to predict loss given default. I focus on available contracting date 
accounting information to provide insights into how accounting-based estimates of LGD explain 
the revealed structure of contracts. Although accounting information at the default date can be used 
to estimate loss given default, such estimates are ex post in nature and cannot be used to infer how 
lenders make their lending decision. 
I utilize a sample of senior unsecured defaulted bonds for which data on LGD realizations 
and accounting information in the year before the issuance of the bond exist to construct a 
prediction model for LGD. The analysis finds that five accounting measures explain a high 
proportion of the variation in LGD.3  Cross-validation test results show that the model has 
significant predictive power for realized LGD out-of-sample. I use the coefficients from the 
prediction model to construct an expected LGD estimate for all non-defaulted, nonconvertible bond 
issuances in the Securities Data Company (SDC) database with available accounting information at 
the date of the issuance.  
Using these estimates of expected LGD, I next investigate the extent to which LGD affects 
debt contract design. I expect that interest spreads will be higher for borrowers with higher 
predicted LGD as lenders will demand compensation for the increased expected losses. Using a 
                                               
3 These measures and their predicted coefficient signs are based on insights from prior research on the determinants of 
LGD at default date (Acharya et al. 2004; Varma and Cantor, 2005). In addition, I report that market-based measures 
such as annual returns, the standard deviation of monthly returns and the Vassalou and Xing (2004) default likelihood 
indicator, measured at the contracting date, do not explain future LGD and do not add to the explanatory power of the 
prediction model when the accounting measures are included. 
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model that includes extensive control variables such as contract terms and industry and year fixed 
effects, I find that expected LGD is associated with higher credit spreads at the bond issuance date. 
Expected LGD continues to be a statistically and economically significant determinant of spread 
after including controls for the probability of default such as the Vassalou and Xing (2004) DLI 
measure, Altman’s Z score and S&P credit rating. The results suggest that a one standard deviation 
increase in LGD expectation adds 58 basis points to the interest rate spread of the debt. 
Because LGD manifests only when the borrower defaults, I expect its effect on credit 
spreads to be stronger when the probability of default is higher. If the probability of default is zero 
LGD does not matter. However, if the probability of default is close to one, LGD should matter a 
lot. I also predict that the effect of LGD on debt contracts will be stronger when borrowers have the 
ability to extract private benefits (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Consistent with these predictions, I 
find that the effect of the predicted LGD on spread is stronger when the probability of default is 
higher and when the entrenchment index of the issuer from Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2008) is 
higher. 
Spread is not the only contract term likely to be affected by LGD expectations. Lenders 
may require collateral when they expect LGD to be higher. In addition, lenders may shorten the 
maturity of loans with higher expected LGD as the higher frequency of re-contracting will allow 
creditors to refuse contract renewal, ask for a better security or require an increase in interest rate 
when expected credit losses have increased. Lenders may also place limits on loan amounts for 
firms with higher expected LGD to limit their exposure to LGD.4 I find evidence consistent with 
these predictions. 
                                               
4 Another debt contract term that may vary with expected LGD is covenant structure. I do not have access to data on 
bond covenants to examine this effect. In addition, public bond contracts seldom require the maintenance of financial 
ratios (Nikolaev, 2010).  Analysis of the effects of expected LGD on covenants is provided below for a sample of 
loans. 
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I next examine how the precision of accounting information impacts the sensitivity of credit 
spreads to accounting-based LGD estimates. It is plausible that lenders place more reliance on 
accounting information in predicting LGD as the precision of the information increases. Appendix 
B presents a simple analytical model that shows how LGD and information about LGD affects the 
credit spread. I find that lenders are more sensitive to predicted LGD when contracting with firms 
characterized as having high value-relevance and timelier accounting. In contrast to arguments in 
the literature, lenders are more sensitive to the predicted LGD in firms with less conservative 
accounting.5,6 
Although private loans differ in many respects from public bonds, I use a sample of private 
loan issuances to provide evidence that analogous relations between expected LGD and debt 
contracts also hold in this setting after controlling for financial covenant strictness. In addition, I 
provide evidence that lenders use stricter covenants when LGD is expected to be higher.  
The inferences above are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests, such as inclusion of credit 
rating fixed effects and different subsets of control variables. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, I 
also show that an LGD measure constructed using random coefficients with the same sign and 
magnitude as the coefficients from the prediction model performs poorly relative to the prediction 
model in explaining spreads. This suggests that the expected LGD measure constructed with the 
coefficients from the prediction model captures a latent structural variable that is distinct from the 
individual accounting measures used to estimate it. In addition, I include each of the accounting 
measures as a control variable and show that none of them affects the inferences described above. 
                                               
5 This argument does not speak to the overall efficiency of a specific accounting system to debt contracting. Rather it 
speaks to the usefulness of an accounting system in the estimation of LGD, which is an important channel in debt 
contracting. However, as discussed in more detail below, other channels exist, for example lenders’ ability to estimate 
default likelihood. 
 
6 The arguments that support conservatism’s efficiency in debt contracting are based on ex-post changes in managerial 
behavior, i.e., lenders will demand higher conservatism after providing funds for the firm. The evidence I provide in 
this study relates to whether conservative accounting is useful to lenders on an ex-ante basis.  
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This study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, I show that 
accounting information available to lenders at the contracting date is significantly associated with 
future loss given default. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to do so. Second, I 
construct an intuitive measure of LGD expectations at the time of debt initiation which could be of 
use in future research. Third, I show that accounting-based expectations about LGD significantly 
affect price and non-price terms of the debt contract. This finding contributes to the LGD and 
liquidation value literature by showing that LGD has significant non-diversifiable effects on debt 
contracts and to the accounting literature by showing a specific channel through which accounting 
information is useful in lending decisions. Fourth, this study contributes to the accounting debt 
contracting literature by providing evidence that lenders put more weight on LGD expectations 
from accounting systems that are more value-relevant, timely and less conservative. Lastly, the 
results of this study highlight the valuation role of accounting in debt contracting, by showing that 
accounting facilitates the estimation of LGD and by implication, liquidation values. This 
complements the emphasis in prior research on the stewardship role of accounting in contracting. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the background and 
motivation for my predictions.  Section 3 describes my data and sample.  Section 4 presents my 
empirical tests and discusses the findings. Section 5 presents several sensitivity tests and section 6 
presents summary and concluding remarks. 
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2. Motivation background and predictions 
 
A substantial body of research in accounting and finance focuses on modeling the 
likelihood of default. This literature uses accounting ratios (e.g., Beaver 1966; Altman, 1968; 
Ohlson, 1980) and variations of the Merton (1974) model (e.g., Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Bharath 
and Shumway, 2008), among other methods, to assess the probability of default. This literature also 
examines the implications of increased probability of default on debt pricing, equity pricing 
(Vassalou and Xing, 2004) and debt policy. It is only recently that research about the second major 
component of credit risk, loss given default, has emerged.7 
LGD, which is defined as the percentage loss lenders experience from $1 of outstanding 
principal in a case of default (or 1 minus the recovery rate), interacts directly with the probability 
of default in determining credit risk (Gupton and Stein, 2005). The credit risk modeling literature 
discusses how credit spreads or the prices of risky bonds and loans are determined as a function of 
probability of default and loss given default. Although credit risk models may differ significantly 
in their assumptions about LGD and its determinants, in all models LGD plays an important role in 
pricing credit risk.8  
Fundamentally, a firm’s net assets and future cash flows provide implicit collateral to 
lenders. The liquidation value of the implicit collateral is a main determinant of LGD as liquidation 
value is inversely related to LGD. Since a borrower cannot commit not to withdraw his human 
                                               
7 See Altman (2009) for a survey of this emerging literature. 
 
8 Altman (2009) categorizes credit risk modeling into several groups. The first group of models is based on Merton’s 
(1974) framework and is termed first generation structural models. In these types of models, default occurs when the 
value of a firm’s assets is lower than that of its liabilities at maturity. In this case, LGD is based on market value of the 
firm’s assets minus the face value of the debt. The second group of models, second generation structural models, 
relaxes the assumption that default occurs only at maturity and assumes that default is triggered when the value of the 
firm’s assets reaches an exogenous threshold level. In these models, LGD is exogenous and is independent from the 
firm’s asset value. The third group of models, reduced-form models, introduces different and separate assumptions on 
the dynamics of the probability of default and LGD and models them independently from the structural features of the 
firm. The stochastic process determines the price of credit risk. The last category of credit risk models, sometimes 
called hybrid models, is motivated by the assumption that systematic factors drive defaults. In some of these models, 
the state of the economy affects default probability and LGD simultaneously. 
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capital (as in Hart and Moore, 1994) or not to divert cash flows (as in Aghion and Bolton, 1992), 
there is an incentive conflict between lenders and borrowers. Because of the incentive conflict, 
lenders will agree to provide funds to borrowers only if the default triggers liquidation. According 
to these models, the yield decreases in the assets’ liquidation value. This occurs because increased 
liquidation value reduces the cost of liquidation which, in equilibrium, reduces the spread charged 
by lenders. In addition, debt maturity increases with liquidation values since higher liquidation 
values increase the assets’ durability and make longer maturity feasible (Hart and Moore, 1994). 
Moreover, these models posit that the funds lenders are willing to provide is directly tied to assets’ 
liquidation values.  Despite the importance of LGD in these models, as Benmelech et al. (2005) 
suggest, empirical evidence on this issue is scarce. In particular, there is very little evidence on 
how lenders obtain and use information about liquidation values and LGD.  
The interest in this issue is exemplified by an important emerging literature. This literature 
utilizes unique settings to examine the link between liquidation value, collateral and debt 
characteristics. Benmelech et al. (2005) focus on the redeployability of property assets as 
determined by commercial zoning regulation and find that more deployable properties receive 
larger loans, longer maturities and lower interest rates. Benmelech (2009) finds that assets’ 
salability in the 19th century railroad industry leads to longer maturities of debt. Benmelech and 
Bergman (2009) study a sample of loans in the airline industry and show that collateral and 
redeployability are negatively correlated with yield spread. I build on this literature by examining 
the link between information available to lenders at the date of the contract about LGD and debt 
contract characteristics in a more general setting. 
This study is also motivated by a growing literature connecting the quality of accounting 
information with the design of debt contracts. Bharath et al. (2008) find that accruals quality is 
associated with the price, maturity and security of debt. Ball et al. (2008) provide evidence that 
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accounting’s ability to capture credit deterioration affects the structure of syndicated loans. Graham 
et al. (2008) show that corporate misreporting leads to a sharp deterioration in debt contract terms 
for the misreporting firms.  Several studies build on Watts (2003) and find evidence that 
conservative accounting is generally beneficial to debt contracting by limiting the agency problem 
between lenders and borrowers (Zhang, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010). Sunder et al. (2009) provide 
evidence that spread is negatively associated with adjusted market to book ratio, suggesting that 
realized conservatism reduces risk by promoting lenders’ confidence in the collateral value of the 
firm’s assets. Recent theoretical studies take differing positions regarding whether conservative 
accounting increases debt contracting efficiency. Whereas Gox and Wagenhofer (2009) claim that 
the optimal accounting system for debt contracting is conservative, Gigler et al. (2009) and Li 
(2008) suggest that since conservative accounting also creates a loss of informativeness, it can 
reduce the efficiency of debt contracts.   
Two recent survey studies call for additional research on these issues. Roberts and Sufi 
(2009) call for future research that links liquidation values or LGD and the structure of debt 
contracts. Armstrong, Guay and Webber (2010) review the accounting literature and suggest that 
lenders are likely to prefer more reliable accounting information to evaluate the firm’s collateral. 
Notably, none of the reviewed papers provide direct evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Armstrong et al. (2010) also suggest that further research is needed to find the channels through 
which the quality of financial reporting affects debt contracts. One of the objectives of my paper is 
to explore such a channel. 
Although LGD plays a central role in debt contracting theory and available accounting 
information may be useful for estimating LGD, it is possible that lenders do not use firm-specific 
accounting information to assess LGD in the design of debt contracts. First, LGD risk could 
potentially be diversified away by lenders, and thus it may have no effect on the debt contract 
10 
 
(Gupton and Stein, 2005; Altman, 2009). This line of reasoning suggests that lenders that hold 
diversified debt portfolios may care only about LGD means across the economy or industry and not 
firm-specific LGD.  A related point is that anecdotal evidence from practitioners suggests that 
lenders use “lookup tables” of historical LGDs based on industry and seniority type, as inputs for 
their lending decisions (Gupton and Stein, 2005). These lookup tables, based primarily on lenders’ 
experience, provide lenders with the historical LGD rate for a debt instrument for a given industry 
and seniority. Although Gupton and Stein (2005) note that lenders augment these historical tables 
with subjective judgment, the nature and the basis of these judgments is unclear. It is also unclear 
how representative this evidence is and how available information about firm-specific LGD is used 
in the lending process.   
Third, since defaults occur several years after the contracting date, 47 months on average in 
my sample, accounting information at the contracting date may have no power for predicting future 
LGD. Fourth, because accounting information is not designed for the purpose of estimation of 
liquidation value that affects LGD, it therefore might be useless for this purpose. Fifth, lenders may 
use private information to estimate LGD and put less weight on publicly available financial 
information. Lastly, LGD is inherently difficult to estimate as evidenced by the fact that lack of 
consistent empirical evidence on its distribution and importance have led analytical and empirical 
researchers to often assume LGD is constant across countries or industries, or ignore its role 
completely (see Acharya et al. 2004 for examples). This inherent difficulty in estimating LGD may 
cause lenders to use alternative measures to protect themselves against LGD loss. Therefore it 
remains an open empirical question whether firm-specific information is useful for lenders to 
assess LGD and whether it affects debt contracts. 
I start with the conjecture that information in the financial statements available to lenders at 
the debt issuance date can predict future losses in the event of default. The informativeness of 
11 
 
financial ratios about the probability of default is the core of the seminal work of Beaver (1966), 
Altman (1968) and many subsequent studies (e.g., Ohlson, 1980 and Zmijewski, 1984). This work 
shows that information in financial statements can predict defaults.  In addition, the LGD literature 
has suggested that certain accounting measures, when observed at the date of default, can predict 
LGD.9 I extend the insights from both literatures and conjecture that certain accounting measures 
available to lenders at the contracting date can also predict LGD. To the best of my knowledge, this 
study is the first to examine the relation between measurs based on accounting information that is 
available to lenders at the debt issuance date and LGD.10   
I use five accounting measures to predict LGD on a sample of 308 defaulted senior 
unsecured bonds.11 I use a homogenous set of senior unsecured debt instruments to make sure the 
accounting measures I use do not capture differences in the seniority and security of debt. Using 
secured instruments as the benchmark for the prediction model may create measurement problems 
with assessing the value and nature of the pledged security. In addition, senior unsecured debt is 
the most common form of debt in the default and LGD dataset (Moody’s Default Risk Services, 
                                               
9 Varma and Cantor (2005) and Acharya et al. (2007) find some relation between accounting measures and LGD 
around the default event. Jacobs and Karagozoglu (2007) use a larger sample and different accounting measures and 
find stronger evidence for this relation.  
 
10 The largest rating agencies have only recently started issuing independent LGD (recovery rate) ratings for debt 
instruments. These ratings are not available for many firms and were not available to lenders for most of the years in 
the sample. In addition, some of these ratings are available only after the contract was designed. As Gupton (2005) 
discusses, a primary goal of Moody’s LGD “LossCalc 2” model is to help lenders to assess LGD for bank regulatory 
provisioning purposes required by the Basel accord. 
 
11 I follow Moody’s definition of default which includes three types of credit events. The first is a missed or delayed 
disbursement of interest and/or principal, including delayed payments made within a grace period. The second is an 
event that ranges between a filing for bankruptcy, administration, legal receivership, or other legal blocks (perhaps by 
regulators) to the timely payment of interest and/or principal. The third and final type is a distressed exchange which 
occurs when: (i) the issuer offers bondholders a new security or package of securities that amounts to a diminished 
financial obligation (such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount, lower seniority, or 
longer maturity); or (ii) the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default. The definition of 
a default is intended to capture events that change the relationship between the bondholder and bond issuer from the 
relationship which was originally contracted, and which subjects the bondholder to an economic loss. Technical 
defaults (covenant violations, etc.) are not included in Moody’s definition of default. 
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DRS database) and the bond issuance data (SDC) that I use in this paper.12 The five accounting 
measures I use are extracted from financial reports published in the year before debt issuance to 
ensure the information was available to lenders. The measures and their predicted associations with 
LGD are based on the intuition suggested in papers that predict LGD with data contemporaneous to 
the default event (Acharya et al. 2005; Varma and Cantor, 2005).   
The first measure is earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) scaled by total assets (ROA). 
ROA is predicted to be negatively associated with LGD. All else equal, the more profitable the 
firm, the greater the chance of lenders getting a higher price for selling the firm as a going concern 
or liquidating the assets. The second ratio is net book assets of the firm scaled by the number of 
shares outstanding (NET_WORTH). I predict a negative association between NET_WORTH and 
LGD. The greater the net assets of the firm, the more unencumbered assets lenders have available 
to sell and recover their investments. The third ratio is intangible to tangible assets 
(INTANGIBLE_RATIO). Many intangible assets are difficult to transfer and thus may yield low 
value in liquidation, creating a positive association between INTANGIBLE_RATIO and LGD. The 
fourth ratio is short term debt to long term debt (STTOLTDEBT). This ratio should be positively 
related to LGD because short term lenders have the ability either to withdraw their funds from the 
firm in the near term or refuse to renew them and thus leave lower net assets for long term debt 
holders in case of default. The final measure is the log of total assets (LTA), which is a proxy for 
the level of complexity in the sale of a firm’s assets and thus the liquidity of those assets.  In 
addition, this measure is associated with the complexity of the firm’s bankruptcy procedures in 
case of a default, which yields lower recovery rates and thus higher predicted LGD. In addition, I 
use Fama and French 17 industries classification indicators to capture industry effects on LGD.  
                                               
12 Another advantage of using defaulted bonds and analyzing LGD in a bond sample, rather than loans, is that bonds 
seldom have financial covenants, which may complicate the analysis (Begley and Freedman, 2004). 
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After evaluating the association between the accounting measures and LGD, I next 
investigate how this information affects debt contract design. Holding probability of default 
constant, I expect that higher LGD will spur lenders to require higher interest rates to compensate 
for higher risk. Moreover, lenders should be more sensitive to LGD in firms that have a higher 
probability of default since LGD by definition occurs only if default occurs. Lenders will use all 
relevant information to assess expected LGD, including accounting information, and will be more 
sensitive to signals that provide more precise information about LGD.  Appendix B presents a 
simple analytical model that shows how LGD and information about LGD affects the credit spread. 
To examine these predictions, I use the estimated coefficients on the five accounting 
measures and industry indicators in the prediction model to construct an LGD expectation measure. 
The measure, PREDICT_LGD, is constructed for a sample of all non-defaulted, non-convertible 
bond issues in the U.S, available on the SDC new issuances database. The measure is effectively 
the predicted value of LGD using the accounting information available to lenders before the 
contract is designed. I expect PREDICT_LGD to be positively associated with interest rate spread 
over the treasury benchmark (SPREAD). Further, PREDICT_LGD should have a distinguishable 
effect from measures of probability of default, and it should have a stronger effect on firms that 
have a higher probability of default.  
Theory also predicts that the effect of liquidation value and LGD on debt contracts will be 
larger when borrowers have the ability to extract private benefits (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Thus 
I expect that the positive association between PREDICT_LGD and spread will be stronger when 
managerial entrenchment is expected to be higher. The reason for that is that managerial 
entrenchment increases the possibility that mangers will take risky projects and consume the 
corporation resources in a way that reduces the value of the firm’s net assets. 
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I also examine the effect of PREDICT_LGD on whether security is required in the debt 
contract. If expected LGD is high, lenders will require borrowers to pledge specific assets against 
the loan to protect against loss in case of default. Thus, I expect the probability of secured 
borrowing to increase with PREDICT_LGD. In addition, LGD risk may cause lenders to shorten 
the maturity of the debt in order to better monitor the situation of the firm and facilitate withdrawal 
of the funds in cases where the probability of default is increasing. This creates a negative expected 
association between PREDICT_LGD and the maturity of debt. Because lenders may limit their 
exposure to firms with high LGD risk, I expect a negative association between PREDICT_LGD 
and the size of the debt relative to the firm’s assets.  These additional tests help mitigate concerns 
that lenders have multiple contracting options to protect themselves against future losses.13 
Consistent evidence on the directional effect of expected LGD across these different debt contract 
characteristics helps to draw stronger conclusions on the observable effects.  
Finally, I predict that PREDICT_LGD will have a stronger effect on SPREAD in firms 
whose accounting information provides a more precise signal on LGD. However, it is not obvious 
which properties of accounting information reflect more precision with respect to predicting LGD.  
One possibility is that accounting systems that recognize economic losses in a more timely manner 
(more conservative) also provide more precise  information to lenders about LGD, since this 
conservative system is designed to provide information about the lower bound of liquidation value 
(Watts, 2003; Sunder et al. 2009). On the other hand, accounting information that more strongly 
predicts changes in equity value may also reflect more precise information to lenders about the 
value of the net assets available to them in case of default and thus more precise information on 
LGD. I examine both possibilities. 
                                               
13 For example, lenders could ask for collateral instead of more interest compensation. 
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Although the prediction model for LGD uses a sample of defaulted bonds, I also assess the 
effects of PREDICT_LGD on a sample of bank loan issuances. Bank loans are different in many 
aspects from corporate bonds but the line of reasoning regarding the relations between LGD and 
debt contract features applies to bank loans as well. Most importantly, banks have the ability to ask 
for information over and above what is provided in financial statements, in addition to the fact that 
the cost of renegotiation is lower relative to public bonds. Using LGD expectation based on 
defaulted bonds makes PREDICT_LGD a noisy proxy for LGD expectations for bank loans. These 
additional analyses help to increase the external validity of the PREDICT_LGD measure and to 
improve understanding about whether the mechanism of adjusting debt contracts to expected losses 
based on accounting information works similarly in private and public debt issuances. In addition, 
using this sample allows me to control for financial covenant strictness and to examine the 
prediction that lenders will use stricter covenants when PREDICT_LGD is higher to protect against 
expected losses. 
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3. Data and sample 
I use information about actual LGD’s contained in Moody’s DRS database. The data 
contain information on over 1,000 defaults as well as information on 30-day recovery pricing, 
which is the price of the bond 30 days after the default event. These data allows me to calculate 
LGD for defaulted bonds. All data are derived from Moody’s own proprietary database of issuer 
and default information. Moody’s analysts use these data to perform their own analysis and 
determine ratings and outlooks for all credits. The database provides the backbone for the Annual 
Default Study, read by more than 40,000 investors globally. According to Moody’s, the data are 
refreshed monthly to provide the most accurate, detailed portrait of default activity available in the 
market. A more thorough description of the data is provided in Varma and Cantor (2005).  
I merge accounting information for the year before the bond was issued from 
COMPUSTAT with the DRS dataset based on CUSIP. For reasons that are discussed above I keep 
only observations of defaulted senior unsecured bonds of non-bank corporations. This sample, 
which I refer to as the DRS sample, contains information on 308 defaulted bonds that have LGD 
and industry data as well as the data needed to calculate the five accounting measures used in the 
prediction model.14 
Table 1 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the DRS sample. On average, bonds lose 
67 percent of their face value, an amount which is consistent with prior literature (Varma and 
Cantor, 2005). At the date of issuance, firms are on average profitable (mean ROA of 0.05) and 
have high NET_WORTH (Mean of 10.84). On average, firms in the DRS sample have more 
intangible than tangible assets (mean INTANGIBLE_RATIO of 2.57); however, the median of 
INTANGIBLE_RATIO is 0.25, which suggests that most of the firms in the DRS sample have more 
tangible than intangible assets. 
                                               
14 The main reason for the drop in the number of observations is the lack of accounting data in Compustat for the year 
prior to the bond issuance. 
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The second step of the analysis requires data on bond issuances that never defaulted. 
Following Bharath et al. (2008), I obtain data on public bonds from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) new issuances database. I use data for bond issuances for the period 1988-2008 and exclude 
convertible bonds. Consistent with prior literature, I also exclude bonds with maturities that are 
shorter than one year as well as those issued by banks. I merge the data from SDC with accounting 
data for the year before the issuance from COMPUSTAT based on CUSIP. I require an observation 
to have all data required for the bond characteristics, PREDICT_LGD, and control variables in 
order to be included in the data. I also eliminate approximately 100 observations that have 
PREDICT_LGD that is larger than one or smaller than zero.15 The final sample, which I refer to as 
the “Bond sample”, contains 3,599 bond issuances.  
Table 1 Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the bond sample. On average the bonds in 
this sample have a 200 basis point spread over the treasury benchmark. The calculated expected 
LGD for this sample has a mean of 0.69. The firms in the bond sample are profitable (mean ROA 
of 0.1) and 62 percent of them are above investment grade.  
I also utilize a sample of private debt issuances to test the effects of LGD expectations on 
debt contracts. The sample of private debt issuances is obtained in a similar manner to Bharath et 
al. (2008) and to the bond sample above. I obtain data for this sample from the Dealscan database 
provided by Loan Prices Corporation. I use all available loans (facilities) in Dealscan with maturity 
longer than 12 months for the period 1988-2006.16 I merge the data from Dealscan to accounting 
data for the year before issuance from COMPUSTAT based on the link table described in Chava 
and Roberts (2008).17 I require an observation to have all data required for the loan characteristics, 
PREDICT_LGD, and control variables in order to be included in the sample. I also eliminate 
                                               
15 Including these observations does not change any of the inferences described below. 
 
16 I stop the sample at 2006 because this is the last Dealscan dataset that is available to me. 
17 I am grateful to Michael Roberts for providing me the link table between COMPUSTAT and Dealscan. 
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approximately 300 observations that have PREDICT_LGD that is larger than one or smaller than 
zero.18 This sample, which I refer to as the “Loan sample”, contains 13,325 loan facilities.  
Table 1 Panel C provides descriptive statistics for the loan sample. On average the loans in 
this sample have a 183 basis point spread over the Libor benchmark. The calculated expected LGD 
for this sample has a mean of 0.63. The firms in the loan sample are profitable (mean ROA of 
0.08). Only 49 percent of the loans have a long term debt rating available in COMPUSTAT, while 
only 20 percent of the sample have higher than investment grade rating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
18 Once again, including these observations does not change any of the results described below. 
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4. Empirical design and results 
 
The empirical design is comprised of several stages. First I examine the association 
between accounting measures at the debt issuance date and LGD. The second stage uses the results 
from the first stage to estimate PREDICT_LGD. The third stage examines the association between 
PREDICT_LGD and debt contract characteristics as well as how different accounting systems 
affect this relation. 
4.1 The predictive ability of accounting measures at the contract date about future LGD 
To empirically assess whether there is an association between accounting ratios and future 
losses, I estimate the following equation using OLS.19  
 
 
LGDid, is loss given default at the default date, and is calculated using data from Moody’s DRS 
dataset as one minus the recovery rate. Where the recovery rate is the price of the instrument one 
month after the default occurred divided by the face value of the instrument. This method is 
consistent with practitioner and academic research (Acharya et al. 2004; Varma and Cantor, 2005; 
Gupton and Stein, 2005), and yields unbiased measure for LGD since there is an active market for 
defaulted debt for a few months after the default which allows traders to buy and sell the defaulted 
instrument (Gupton and Stein, 2005).  
The five accounting measures I use are ROA, NET_WORTH, INTANGIBLE_RATIO, 
STTOLTDEBT and LTA. These measures and their expected associations with LGD are described 
                                               
19 Since the dependent variable, LGD, is between zero and one, OLS estimated coefficients may be biased. Logit 
transformation and Pepke and Wooldridge (1996) estimation methods were also used. These methods yield similar 
results to the ones using OLS, thus for simplicity of the calculations and interpretation I use OLS. In addition, if the 
coefficients that I based my expected LGD on are biased it would be harder for me to obtain results in the following 
tests. 
(1) 
LGDid = 0 + 1* ROAi,t-1 + 2* NET_WORTHi,t-1 + 
3*INTANGIBLE_RATIOi,t-1 + 4* STTOLTDEBTi,t-1 + 5* LTAi,t-1 +6-22*ind +i 
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more thoroughly in section 2 above.20 ind  are industry indicator variables for each of the Fama-
French 17 industries classification.21 The industry indicators capture mean differences in LGD 
between different industries and allow the accounting measures to capture differences between 
firms that are not related to industries. Appendix A discusses the sources of data for the variables.22 
I estimate equation (1) on the DRS sample described in section 3. Table 2 presents the 
results from this estimation. Model 1 presents the estimation of equation (1) without industry fixed 
effects, Model 2 presents the estimation of the regression with just the fixed effects and none of the 
accounting measures, while Model 3 provides results for the estimation using accounting measures 
and fixed effects.  
The results from the estimation of Model 1 show that the five accounting measures provide 
information to lenders about LGD. Model 3 suggests that the accounting measures are significant 
determinants of LGD over and above the industry means that many lenders use as predictors 
(Gupton and Stein, 2005). As expected ROA is negatively associated with LGD (coefficient of -
0.907 with a t-statistic of -4.88 in model 1, and coefficient of -0.781 with a t-statistic of -4.11 in 
model 3), which suggests that firms that were more profitable at the issuance date have higher 
recovery rates. NET_WORTH is also negatively associated with LGD (coefficient of -0.005 with a 
t-statistic of -3.94 in model 1, and coefficient of -0.004 with a t-statistic of -2.79 in model 3), which 
as predicted suggests that the greater the net assets of the firm, the lower the losses debt holders 
incur in case of default. INTANGIBLE_RATIO, STTOLTDEBT and LTA are all positively and 
                                               
20 The only purpose of this prediction model is to construct an accounting based measure of LGD expectation at the 
contracting date. Thus I do not claim these measures are the only ones or the best ones to explain LGD and I 
acknowledge that the prediction model may be improved in future research. I found these measures to be intuitive, 
available for most firms on COMPUSTAT and statistically sufficient for the analysis presented in this paper. 
 
21 The industry classification is available on Ken French’s website. 
 
22 I tried several specifications that include more variables that were suggested by prior literature as predictors of LGD 
at the default date. Among these variables are market-based variables such as returns, standard deviation of returns and 
DLI. None of these variables when measured at the contract date has statistical power in explaining LGD once the 
accounting measures are included and none adds to the explanatory power of the model. Thus, I omit them from the 
prediction model and use the model in equation (2). 
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significantly associated with future LGD. INTANGIBLE_RATIO has a coefficient of 0.003 with a t-
statistic of 5.04 in model 1 and a coefficient of 0.003 with a t-statistic of 4.17 in model 3, which 
suggests that firms with higher intangible assets relative to their tangible assets are valued less in 
case of default. STTOLTDEBT has a coefficient of 0.018 with a t-statistic of 2.79 in model 1 and a 
coefficient of 0.025 with a t-statistic of 2.71 in model 3. This result is consistent with the ability of 
short-term lenders to pull out their funds in a more timely manner relative to long-term lenders and 
thus leave the firm with lower net assets in case of default. LTA has a coefficient of 0.063 with a t-
statistic of 5.83 in model 1 and a coefficient of 0.062 with a t-statistic of 5.07 in model 3. This 
result is consistent with the fact that the bankruptcy proceedings are more complicated when firms 
have more assets and that selling more assets in case of default requires larger liquidity discounts.  
Model 2 is presented to show that the adjusted R-squared of the estimation of only fixed 
effects (industry means) is slightly smaller than the adjusted R-squared of using only the 
accounting measures (R-squared of  0.17 compared to 0.18). More generally, the accounting 
measures have significant predictive power regarding LGD by themselves (R-squared of 0.18) but 
more so when industry fixed effects are used (R-squared of 0.28). Taken together the results in 
table 2 suggest that information in the financial statements, available to debt investors at the 
issuance date, has significant predictive ability about future LGD.23 
4.2 Constructing LGD expectation measure-PREDICT_LGD  
 
I use the coefficients from the estimation of equation (1) to construct PREDICT_LGD. 
Using the bond sample described in section 3 above, I multiply each estimated coefficient from 
equation (1) by the relevant accounting measure in the year before the bond issuance and add them  
 
                                               
23 I also perform out of sample cross-validation tests using holdout samples. I randomly choose 200 observations from 
the sample and estimate equation (1) using these observations. I continue by constructing the predicted value of LGD 
for the holdout sample of 108 observations.  I then estimate the correlation between the predicted and realized LGD in 
the holdout sample. I repeat this procedure 50 times. The average correlation is high (0.51). 
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together with the relevant industry intercept to obtain PREDICT_LGD for every bond in the 
sample. For example PREDICT_LGD for a firm j from industry z that issued a bond in a year t is 
given by equation (2). 
 
  
 
where i  are the estimated coefficients from equation (1). 0 is the intercept obtained from equation 
(1) and z is the incremental industry intercept. I use the same method to construct PREDICT_LGD 
separately in the loan sample. 
4.3 The relation between PREDICT_LGD and debt contract terms 
To assess the relation between lenders’ expectation of LGD and debt contract 
characteristics, I follow a research design used extensively in the debt contracting literature 
(Bharath et al. 2008, Ivashina, 2008). Specifically, I estimate the association between 
PREDICT_LGD and the price and non-price characteristics of the debt contract.  
4.3.1 The relation between PREDICT_LGD and SPREAD 
 
To examine the relation between PREDICT_LGD and the price of debt, I start by 
estimating the following OLS regression. 
 
where SPREAD is the interest rate spread over a treasury benchmark at the date of the bond 
issuance. PREDICT_LGD is the estimated predicted LGD for the bond that is obtained from 
equation (2). X is a vector of variables used frequently in the literature to control for other 
determinants of the credit spread. X includes the size of the issuer (LSIZE), the leverage of the 
issuer (LEV), the issuer’s growth opportunities (Q), the size of the debt issuance 
PREDICT_LGDjt = 0 +z+1* ROAj,t-1+ 2* NET_WORTHj,t-1  
+ 3* INTANGIBLE_RATIOj,t-1 + 4* STTOLTDEBTj,t-1 + 5* LTAj,t-1, 
(2) 
SPREADit = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Xi,t-1 + ++ , (3) 
23 
 
(LFACEAMOUNT), the maturity of the debt (LMATURITY), an indicator variable for secured debt 
(SECURED), an indicator variable for above investment grade debt (INV_GRADE), and an 
indicator variable for rated debt (SPRATED).  and  are industry and year fixed effects, 
respectively. The presence of industry fixed effects in equation (3) isolates the firm-specific 
expected LGD from the industry level to identify a unique firm-specific information effect. 
Appendix A provides further description on the source and construction of the variables.24  
Results from estimating equation (3) on the bond sample are presented in table 3. Model 1 
presents the estimation of equation (3) with industry fixed effects and excludes year fixed effects. 
Model 2 constrains the industry estimators in the construction of PREDICT_LGD to be zero, which 
effectively uses only the accounting measures to create the ACC_PREDICT_LGD measure. By 
construction, all the coefficients in Model 2, except for the intercept, should be identical to the 
coefficients in Model 1. Model 2 is included to show that constraining the industry coefficients to 
be zero is identical to using industry fixed effects.  Model 3 presents the estimation of equation (3) 
with industry and year fixed effects. For the sake of brevity, I discuss only the implication of the 
results of model 3 and highlight the differences from other models. 
The estimation results in model 3 show that PREDICT_LGD is positively and significantly 
associated with SPREAD (coefficient of 415.9 with a t-statistic of 9.09). This result is consistent 
with the explanation that lenders use information about LGD available to them in the financial 
statements to price debt. The accounting information as reflected in PREDICT_LGD explains the 
cross-sectional variation in SPREAD incremental to any industry effect, as is clear from the 
industry fixed effects estimation and from model 2.25 The effect is economically significant where 
                                               
24 Although they are generally not included in debt contracting research design, in untabulated results, I add to all 
estimated models described in this paper the equity characteristics annual returns and standard deviation of monthly 
returns. The addition of these variables does not change any of the inferences described in this paper. 
25 Model 2 confirms that when industry fixed effects are included it is identical to using a measure of PREDICT_LGD 
that constrains the industry estimates from the prediction model to be zero. 
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a one standard deviation change (14%) in PREDICT_LGD translates to a 58 basis point change in 
SPREAD which is 29.1% of the SPREAD mean. This result suggests that LGD expectations have a 
significant economic effect on the pricing of debt contracts.26,27 
4.3.2 The effect of PREDICT_LGD and SPREAD over and above default likelihood 
 
A concern is that PREDICT_LGD, or more generally loss given default, is correlated with 
default likelihood. A positive correlation between PREDICT_LGD and default likelihood is likely 
since in distressed periods, firms may be forced into fire sales of their assets and liquidation values 
at these unfavorable times (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Acharya et al. 2008).28 Thus, an important 
feature of the research design is to distinguish between PREDICT_LGD and default likelihood. I 
use three different measures of default likelihood to isolate the effect of PREDICT_LGD. I use the 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) default likelihood indicator (DLI), Altman’s (1968) Z score multiplied 
by negative one (Z), and a numeric conversion of S&P long term rating (SPRATING). All measures 
are constructed in a way that their respective higher values are proxies for higher likelihood of 
default. Although all three measures are proxies for likelihood of default, they are all constructed 
very differently, which allows me to better identify the unique effect of expected LGD on the 
contract. DLI is based on the Merton (1974) model and is constructed using information in stock 
prices, debt and assets. Z score is constructed using accounting ratios that were shown to have 
predictive ability about future defaults. SPRATING is based on debt analysts’ forecasts about the 
quality of the firm’s long term debt. 
                                               
26 For the sake of brevity, I do not discuss the results of the control variables estimates for any of the estimations in this 
study except in cases where these results are important to the purposes of this paper. However, I note that these 
estimates are generally consistent with prior literature. 
 
27 When I include the five accounting measures in these tests instead of the constructed measure of predicted LGD, I 
find that some the accounting measures are insignificant in explaining spread. In addition, the five accounting measures 
do not add to the explanatory power of the model compared to models that include the predicted LGD measure. 
 
28 Untabulated correlations confirm this intuition. PREDICT_LGD is positively and significantly correlated with 
measures of probability of default (0.2 with Z score and 0.16 with DLI). 
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 To assess whether the effect of PREDICT_LGD is over and above the default likelihood, I 
estimate a variation of equation (3) by adding each of the default likelihood controls one by one 
and then adding all of the three measures to the regression at the same time.29 If PREDICT_LGD 
indeed captures the construct of expected loss given default it should have a distinct effect on 
SPREAD that is over and above the probability of default. This feature of LGD is also a clear 
prediction from the model described in Appendix B. 
Table 4 presents results from these tests. Model 1 includes DLI as a control variable, Model 
2 includes Z, and Model 3 includes the S&P credit rating. Model 4 includes all three additional 
control variables in the regression. Model 5 uses the S&P ratings as fixed effects to estimate the 
effects of LGD on SPREAD within a rating group, i.e., the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in this 
estimation comes from the variation that is not related to credit risk as represented by S&P credit 
ratings. In all models, the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD is still statistically and economically 
significant.  Model 5 is where the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD is the lowest (250.1) and has with 
a t-statistic of 6.22.30 Model 4 is where the t-statistic of the PREDICT_LGD coefficient is the 
lowest (4.84) with a coefficient value of 268.19. Taken together the results in table 4 suggest that 
PREDICT_LGD has an incremental, significant effect on debt pricing over and above the 
probability of default. 
4.3.3 The effect of default likelihood on the relation between PREDICT_LGD and SPREAD 
 
 Since losses to debt holders occur only when a default event occurs, I expect SPREAD to be 
more sensitive to PREDICT_LGD when the likelihood of default is higher. In the extreme case 
when the probability of default is zero, loss given default means very little to debt investors. 
However, when the probability of default is close to one, debt investors should put higher weights 
                                               
29 This assumes the relation between probability of default and LGD is linear. In the next section I relax this 
assumption. 
 
30 The coefficient on Z is statistically insignificant. When I omit PREDICT_LGD from the model, Z is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in explaining SPREAD.  
26 
 
on how much they would be able to recover. To examine this effect I partition my sample into two 
groups of high and low default likelihood. I partition the sample based on each of the default 
likelihood proxies, i.e., one partition that is based on below and above the median of DLI, a second 
partition that is based on below and above the median of Z, and a third partition that is based on 
below and above INV_GRADE.   I then estimate equation (3) for each of the groups for every 
partition variable. For the reasons suggested above, I expect the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD, 1, 
to be greater in the high likelihood of default group than it is in the group where the likelihood of 
default is lower.31 The comparison of the coefficients across partitions is done using a Monte-Carlo 
non-parametric simulation technique where I randomly assign observations into the partitions and 
take the difference between the coefficients 1,000 times.32 
The results of this analysis are presented in table 5. Model 1 presents estimations based on 
the partition of over and above the median DLI. Model 2 presents estimations based on the 
partition of over and above the median Z. Model 3 presents estimations based on the partition of 
below and above investment grade. As predicted, in Model 1, the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in 
the high DLI bonds (625.7) is larger than the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in the low DLI bonds 
(154.8) where the difference (470.95) is significant at the 1% level. In Model 2, the coefficient on 
PREDICT_LGD in the high Z bonds (626.2) is larger than the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in the 
low Z bonds (366.1) where the difference (260.1) is significant at the 1% level. In Model 3, the 
coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in the below investment grade bonds (498.5) is larger than the 
coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in the above investment grade bonds (101.5) where the difference 
                                               
31 This design is conceptually similar to the use of a design that includes in the regression an indicator variable for high 
probability of default, PREDICT_LGD and their interaction, including the interaction of all control variables with the 
indicator variable.  
 
32 For more details concerning the theory and technical details behind randomization testing, see Edgington and 
Onghena (2007) and Owens (2010). 
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(397.0) is significant at the 1% level. All three models are consistent with the prediction that when 
the probability of default is higher, lenders are more sensitive to expected LGD. 
4.3.4 The effect of managerial entrenchment on the relation between PREDICT_LGD and 
SPREAD 
 Theory predicts that lenders will rely more on liquidation values and LGD when agency 
conflicts between lenders and borrowers are greater. To assess whether lenders require higher 
interest rate compensation for LGD risk when agency conflicts are greater, I merge my sample with 
the entrenchment index (EINDEX) from Bebchuk et al. (2008) at the year of the bond issuance. 
This index captures insiders’ ability to extract private benefits from the corporation. I partition my 
sample into high entrenchment and low entrenchment issuers based on the sample median of 
EINDEX, reestimate a variation of equation (3) for each partition, and test for the difference in the 
coefficients between groups. As above, the test of the difference between the coefficients across 
partitions is based on Monte-Carlo simulation.  
 The results of this analysis are presented in table 6. As predicted, the coefficient on 
PREDICT_LGD in the high EINDEX corporations (378.5) is larger than the coefficient on 
PREDICT_LGD in the low EINDEX (178.6) where the difference (199.9) is significant at the 5% 
level. This result is consistent with lenders putting more emphasis on liquidation values when the 
potential for private benefits extraction is greater. 
4.3.5 The relation between PREDICT_LGD and the probability of secured debt borrowing 
 
The price of the debt contract (SPREAD) is not the only term of the contract that is 
expected to be affected by LGD.  Debt investors potentially can limit their exposure to LGD by 
asking the debt issuer to pledge assets against the funds. Thus when debt investors expect LGD to 
be higher, we may observe an increase in the probability the debt will be secured. To examine this 
possibility I estimate the following logit regression.  
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where SECURED and PREDICT_LGD are as defined above. As discussed earlier, the coefficient 
on PREDICT_LGD, 1, is expected to be positive. C is a vector of the control variables.  and  are 
industry and year fixed effects, respectively.  
Table 7 presents results from estimating equation (4). Model 1 includes only a binary 
variable for above investment grade firms as a control variable for probability of default. Model 2 
includes two additional variables, DLI and Z, as controls for probability of default and model 3 
includes SPRATING as a control. In all three models PREDICT_LGD is positively and 
significantly associated with the probability a bond will be secured (coefficients of 12.9, 9.1, and 
13.2 with z-statistics of 5.4, 3.6 and 5.0 in Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively). This finding is 
consistent with lenders demanding a specific security against their investments when expected 
losses are larger. Such security may reduce lenders’ exposure to LGD. 
4.3.6 The relation between PREDICT_LGD and debt maturity 
 
Another measure that lenders can take to reduce their exposure to LGD is to provide funds 
with shorter maturity. The reason shorter maturity reduces lenders’ exposure to LGD is that it 
enables them to assess the likelihood of default with greater frequency. If the borrower has high 
expected LGD, the lender will want to monitor the borrower’s probability of default more often so 
if an increase in default likelihood occurs, the lender is able to refuse renewal of the contract. To 
assess this possibility, I estimate the following OLS regression.  
  
where LMATURITY and PREDICT_LGD are as defined above. As discussed earlier, the coefficient 
on PREDICT_LGD, 1, is expected to be negative. P is a vector of control variables and  and  are 
industry and year fixed effects, respectively. 
(4) 
LMATURITYit = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Pi,t-1 + ++, (5) 
Prob(SECURED)it = 0 + 1*PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Ci,t-1 + ++, 
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I present the results from these tests in table 8.  Model 1 includes only a binary variable for 
above investment grade firms as a control variable for probability of default. Model 2 includes two 
additional variables, DLI and Z, as controls for probability of default and model 3 includes 
SPRATING as a control. In all three models PREDICT_LGD is negatively and significantly 
associated with the length of the debt contract (coefficients of -0.758, -0.710, -0.680 with t-
statistics of -3.5, -2.9 and -3.1 in Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively). This finding is consistent with 
lenders being willing to lend funds for shorter time periods when the expected losses in case of 
default are higher. This may occur because lenders want to monitor the debt for higher 
PREDICT_LGD firms more closely and frequently. 
4.3.7 The relation between PREDICT_LGD and debt size 
 
The liquidation value literature has suggested that lenders may place limits on loan amounts 
for firms with low liquidation value. Lenders may want to limit their exposure to LGD risk and 
thus provide fewer funds to high LGD firms. To examine this possibility I estimate the following 
OLS regression.  
  
where SDEBTSIZE is the face value of the debt divided by the borrower’s total assets. 
PREDICT_LGD is as defined above. For the reason discussed above, the coefficient on 
PREDICT_LGD, 1, is expected to be negative. E is a vector of the various variables used in the 
literature to control for other determinants of debt size.  and  are industry and year fixed effects, 
respectively. 
I present the results from these estimations in table 9.  Model 1 includes only a binary 
variable for above investment grade firms as a control variable for probability of default. Model 2 
includes two additional variables, DLI and Z, as controls for probability of default and model 3 
includes SPRATING as a control. PREDICT_LGD is negatively and significantly associated with 
SDEBTSIZEit = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Ei,t-1 + ++, (6) 
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the size of the debt in all models (coefficients of -0.202, -0.246 and -0.214 with t-statistics of -2.5, -
2.8 and -2.5 in Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively). This finding is consistent with lenders supplying 
fewer funds to lenders with high expected LGD in order to limit their exposure.  
4.3.8 The effect of the precision of the accounting signal on the relation between PREDICT_LGD 
and SPREAD 
 
 If accounting provides an informative signal about LGD to debt investors, then, investors 
should put more weight on accounting predictors of LGD from accounting systems that provide 
more precise information about it.33 The qualities of an accounting system that generates more 
precise signals on LGD is an empirical question. I use measures for three accounting system 
qualities, RELEVANCE, TIMELINESS and CONSERVATISM, to address this question.34 These 
qualities are commonly used in the accounting literature with some variation in the way the 
measures are constructed. I follow Francis et al. (2004) in the construction of the measures.  
Although all three measures have compelling justification for why they should provide more 
precise information on LGD, they capture inherently different characteristics. RELEVANCE is the 
explanatory power from a regression of concurrent stock returns on earnings and changes in 
earnings. More formally, RELEVANCE is the R-squared from the following regression, estimated 
for a firm-specific time series for firms with a maximum of 10 years and a minimum of 4 years of 
available data before the debt issuance. 
 
where RET  is the cumulative return for the 15 months ended 3 months after the fiscal year end. 
NIBEX is net income before extraordinary items and ΔNIBEX is the change in net income before 
extraordinary items. The construct RELEVANCE attempts to capture how well an accounting 
system captures changes in the value of the firm.  
                                               
33 In this paper I use the terms signal precision and signal quality interchangeably.  
 
34 See a discussion on the construction of these measures below. 
RETit = 0 + 1* NIBEXit + 2* ΔNIBEXit+, (7) 
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TIMELINESS is the explanatory power from a regression of earnings on concurrent returns, 
an indicator variable for negative returns and the interaction between the two. More formally, 
TIMELINESS is the R-squared from the following regression, estimated for a firm-specific time 
series for firms with a maximum of 10 years and a minimum of 5 years of available data before the 
debt issuance. 
 
 
where RET and NIBEX are defined above and D is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
when RET is negative. This measure is aimed to capture how timely earnings are, or how earnings 
capture the information in concurrent news.  
CONSERVATISM is the coefficient on bad news from equation (5) relative to the 
coefficient on good news from equation (5). More formally CONSERVATISM is defined as (λ 3 + λ 
2)/λ 2. CONSERVATISM attempts to capture how timely a firm recognizes bad news.  
  I partition my sample based on high and low values, based on the median, of each of the 
three accounting system characteristics, RELEVANCE, TIMELINESS and CONSERVATISM. I then 
estimate equation (3) separately for each of the high and low groups. If an accounting system 
characteristic provides more precise information on LGD then the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD, 
1, should be greater in the high group than in the low group and vice versa.35  As in section 4.3.3, 
the comparison of the coefficients across partitions is preformed using a Monte-Carlo non-
parametric simulation technique.  
Table 10 provides results from the estimation of equation (3) based on partitions on the 
three proxies for information precision. Model 1 partitions the sample for high and low 
RELEVANCE firms. The results of the estimation of Model 1 suggest that the coefficient on 
                                               
35 A better strategy empirically to assess this question is to examine first the predictive ability of the LGD prediction 
model under each partition and then to test whether models with better predictive ability are weighted more heavily by 
investors. However, sample size limitations at the prediction model stage preclude using this strategy.  
NIBEXit = λ0 + λ1* Dit +λ 2* RETit + λ3* RETit *Dit+, (8) 
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PREDICT_LGD in the high RELEVANCE firms (374.3) is larger than the coefficient on 
PREDICT_LGD in the low RELEVANCE firms (210.8) where the difference (163.5) is significant 
at the 1% level. This result is consistent with firms that have accounting systems that provide more 
relevant information about changes in firms’ market values, also provide more precise information 
to lenders about LGD.  
Model 2 partitions the sample for high and low TIMELINESS firms. The results of the 
estimation of Model 2 suggest that the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in the high TIMELINESS 
firms (469.8) is larger than the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in the low TIMELINESS firms 
(154.0) where the difference (315.8) is significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the 
claim that firms that have accounting systems that provide information that better maps news (as 
represented by returns) into earnings, also provide more precise information to lenders about LGD.  
On the contrary, Model 3 partitions the sample for high and low CONSERVATISM firms. 
The results of the estimation of Model 3 suggest that the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in the high 
CONSERVATISM firms (190.4) is lower than the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD in the low 
CONSERVATISM firms (376.2) where the difference (185.8) is significant at the 1% level.36 This 
result suggests that relevant, not conservative, accounting provides valuable information to lenders 
about liquidation values at the contracting date. 
An interesting finding from table 10 is that firms with more conservative accounting 
systems provide more precise information to lenders about the probability of default. This can be 
seen from comparing the coefficients on DLI in model 3 between the high (coefficient of 222.5 
with t-statistics of 4.58) and low conservatism (coefficient of 86.1 with t-statistics of 1.52) groups. 
However I leave the exploration of this channel to future research. 
 
                                               
36 I also use the equity market-to-book ratio as a proxy for conservatism (Sunder et al. 2009). None of the inferences 
changes using this proxy. 
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4.3.9 Bank Loans and PREDICT_LGD  
 
Thus far, I have used a sample of bond issuances to assess the relation between LGD and 
debt contract characteristics. I next apply equation (2) to construct PREDICT_LGD for the bank 
loan sample described in section 3 above. Since the coefficients that comprise PREDICT_LGD are 
based on defaulted bonds, the measurement error of PREDICT_LGD in the bank loan sample is 
greater. However, this fact will tend to bias against finding results in this sample. I repeat the 
analysis on the relation between PREDICT_LGD and debt contract characteristics in the bank loan 
sample in an attempt to extend the external validity of my findings and to test whether the contract 
adjustment mechanisms for LGD work in loans and bonds similarly. 
I present the results of these tests in table 11-Panel A. The results show that the main 
findings in the bond sample can be extended to the bank loan sample. Model 1 shows that 
PREDICT_LGD is positively associated with the spread over the Libor benchmark with a 
coefficient of 195.4 and t-statistic of 11.24. Model 2 shows that PREDICT_LGD is positively 
associated with the probability a loan will be secured (a coefficient of 0.87 and t-statistic of 2.0). I 
also show, in Model 3, that the maturity of bank loans is negatively associated with 
PREDICT_LGD (a coefficient of -0.97 and t-statistic of -9.70). Lastly, I show, in Model 4, that the 
size of bank loans is negatively associated with PREDICT_LGD (a coefficient of -1.496 and t-
statistic of -7.13).37 These results suggest that the mechanism through which LGD affects bond 
terms is similar to the mechanism through which it affects loan contracts. 
Using to the bank loan sample also allows me to examine how financial covenants affect 
the results presented in this paper and to evaluate the relation between the strictness of the financial 
covenants and PREDICT_LGD. To do this, I use a measure of covenant strictness 
(COV_STRICTNESS) which is based on Murfin (2010). This measure captures the ex-ante 
                                               
37 In this model, I use the natural log of SDEBTSIZE because the distribution of this variable is highly skewed in the 
loan sample. If I do not use the natural log of SDEBTSIZE, the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD has the predicted sign 
but it is not statistically significant. 
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probability of covenants violation based on how far the financial ratios are from the covenants and 
the standard deviation of the ratios. Table 11-Panel B presents the results of this exercise. Model 1 
to Model 4 show that all the results that were documented in Table 11-Panel A hold after 
controlling for COV_STRICTNESS despite the fact that the sample size drops significantly because 
of the unavailability of the strictness measure. Model 5 shows that PREDICT_LGD is positively 
associated with COV_STRICTNESS (coefficient of 0.734 with t-statistic of 6.89). This result is 
consistent with the predication that lenders tend to give less financial slack to borrowers with high 
expected LGD. 
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5.  Sensitivity tests  
 
5.1 Does PREDICT_LGD capture the direct effect of the underlying accounting measures that 
comprise it on contracts, and how unique is the linear combination that comprises it?  
 
One concern about the findings above is that any linear combination of the elements that 
comprise PREDICT_LGD will yield similar results. In other words, the question arises as to how 
unique is the linear combination the estimation of equation (1) provides. It may be that 
PREDICT_LGD captures the direct effect of the accounting measures it is comprised of on the debt 
contract (e.g., the direct relation between ROA and SPREAD or the direct relation between 
NETWORTH and SPREAD that is not operating through LGD). Since there are potentially an 
infinite number of linear combinations for the coefficients, in an attempt to address these questions, 
I use a simulation technique.  
The simulation proceeds as follows. I randomly choose a number from a uniform 
distribution between zero and one for each of the five coefficients of the accounting measures that 
make PREDICT_LGD. To each random coefficient I attach the sign I obtained from equation (1). 
For example, the new random coefficient on ROA will be a number between negative one and zero 
and the new random coefficient on LTA will be a number between zero and one. I restrict the 
coefficients to be between zero and one because this is the range of the “true” coefficients obtained 
originally from equation (1). After obtaining the new five random coefficients, I recalculate 
PREDICT_LGD for the bond sample using the new random coefficients. I estimate equation (3) 
using the new PREDICT_LGD and check the significance level on its coefficient. I repeat this 
procedure 1,000 times.  
Untabulated findings indicate that out of the 1,000 estimations, the coefficient on the new 
PREDICT_LGD is only significant 66 times at the 5 percent level and 0 times at the 1 percent 
level. In other words, in this technique, I basically guess the coefficients armed with the 
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information about their range and sign. Out of 1,000 guesses, in only 66 attempts do I obtain a 
linear combination that significantly explains SPREAD.38 
 This finding is consistent with the claim that the information about the linear combination 
obtained from equation (1) is important and not just any linear combination of the coefficients will 
work. This also means that PREDICT_LGD does not capture by construction the effects of the 
underlying accounting measures on SPREAD.  
5.2 Additional robustness and sensitivity tests. 
 
I conduct numerous sensitivity tests.  Among them are: adding each of the variables that 
comprise LGD to the regression as a control variable to test that none of them by itself significantly 
affects the inferences described above;39 adding the industry LGD means and the accounting 
predicted LGD separately to the regressions; removing different subsets of control variables, 
including observations with PREDICT_LGD that are below zero and above one; adding DLI, 
yearly returns and standard deviation of monthly returns to the prediction model; and including 
yearly returns and the standard deviation of monthly returns as control variables to all tests. None 
of these additional tests change the inferences from the results presented above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
38 In an additional test I use a similar technique and choose four coefficients randomly and let the fifth coefficient, 
(ROA), be the one that allows PREDICT_LGD of the median firm in the sample and PREDICT_LGD of the median 
firm using the original “true” coefficients to be identical. I find that only in 16 cases the coefficient on PREDICT_LGD 
is statistically significant in explaining SPREAD. 
 
39 Adding all the variables into the regression is not feasible because of full multicolinarity (PREDICT_LGD is a linear 
combination of the variables). 
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6. Conclusions 
This study addresses the effects of information available to lenders in the financial reports 
about loss given default at the contracting date on price and non-price terms of debt contracts. First, 
using a sample of defaulted senior unsecured bonds, I show that the information contained in five 
accounting measures that are available to lenders in the financial statements at the contracting date, 
is significantly associated with future LGD in a predictable manner. I use the estimation of the 
relation between these accounting measures and LGD to construct a measure of expected loss 
given default at the contracting date for non-defaulted debt instruments which I name 
PREDICT_LGD.  I predict, using a simple analytical model, and find that PREDICT_LGD is 
positively associated with bond credit spread over the treasury benchmark. This relation is 
incremental to the effect of the probability of default on spreads. Moreover, as expected, the 
relation between PREDICT_LGD and credit spread is stronger when the probability of default and 
managerial entrenchment are greater. PREDICT_LGD is also strongly associated with non-price 
contract terms. Bonds of firms with higher expected LGD have a greater probability of being 
secured and having shorter maturity. In addition, bonds of firms with higher PREDICT_LGD are 
smaller relative to the borrower’s assets. I also use a sample of bank loan issuances to show that 
these findings hold after controlling for covenant strictness and that covenants strictness is higher 
when expected LGD is higher. 
I also find evidence that suggests accounting systems that are more value-relevant and more 
timely are more useful for lenders in assessing LGD. This finding manifests in a greater sensitivity 
of credit spread to PREDICT_LGD for bonds of firms that have more value-relevant and more 
timely accounting systems. On the other hand, lenders are more sensitive to PREDICT_LGD in 
firms that have less conservative accounting systems.  
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Although the relations between PREDICT_LGD and credit spread, security and maturity 
are robust to many sensitivity tests, and consistent with economic theory and intuition, it is possible 
that other correlated forces drive these relations. Debt contracts are complicated mechanisms and it 
is therefore possible that PREDICT_LGD captures unobserved or unexamined parts of this relation 
such as debt covenants. Another concern is the fact that I use only defaulted firms to obtain the 
coefficients that comprise the estimates of PREDICT_LGD. A possibility is that the coefficients in 
the prediction model capture some underlying unobserved characteristics that caused these firms to 
default. This concern is mitigated by the fact that I am able to control for the probability of default 
in the second step. In addition, controlling for year and industry fixed effects also mitigates this 
concern.  
This study leaves much room for future research. Questions such as what are the effects of 
LGD on renegotiation outcomes of debt contracts, and what are the effects of LGD on equity 
pricing are important in the finance and economic literature and can be addressed using some of the 
techniques suggested in this study. In addition, further validation and improvement of 
PREDICT_LGD 
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Appendix A: Definitions 
Names of Variables Description Detailed Description and Source 
LGD Loss given default = (1- recovery rate)  Equals to one minus the recovery rate on 
a defaulted bond. Recovery rate is 
calculated as the market price of the bond 
30 days after default occurred divided by 
the face value of the bond.  
Source: Moody’s DRS  
ROA Return on assets  Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
scaled by total assets. 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
NET_WORTH Net Worth 
 
Total assets less total liabilities scaled by 
number of shares outstanding 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
INTANGIBLE_RATIO Intangible to tangible ratio Intangible assets divided by tangible 
assets 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
STTOLTDEBT Short term to long term debt ratio Short term debt divided by long term debt 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
LTA Log of total assets Equals to the natural log of total assets 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
PREDICT_LGD Predicted (expected) LGD Is calculated by multiplying the 
coefficients obtained from equation (1)  
LGD id = 0 + 1* ROAi t-1 + 2* 
NET_WORTHi t-1 + 3* 
INTANGIBLE_RATIO i t-1 + 4* 
STTOLTDEBT i t-1 + 5* LTAi t-1 +6-
22*ind +  that is estimated on a sample 
of defaulted senior unsecured bonds with 
the relevant accounting measures and 
industry classification in the bond and 
loan samples. The calculation is given by 
equation (2) above. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
ACC_PREDICT_LGD Accounting predicted (expected) LGD Is calculated by multiplying the 
coefficients obtained from equation (1)  
LGD id = 0 + 1* ROAi t-1 + 2* 
NET_WORTHi t-1 + 3* 
INTANGIBLE_RATIO i t-1 + 4* 
STTOLTDEBT i t-1 + 5* LTAi t-1 +6-
22*ind +  that  is estimated on a sample 
of defaulted senior unsecured bonds with 
the relevant accounting measures and 
industry classification in the bond and 
loan samples where the industry 
coefficients (6-22) are constraint to be 
zero.  
Source: Author’s calculation 
EINDEX Entrenchment index The E index from Bebchuk et al. (2008). 
Based on 6 IRRC provisions. 
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Names of Variables Description Detailed Description and Source 
LSIZE Log of market value of equity Equals to the natural log of the market 
value of equity 
Source: COMPUSTAT, CRSP 
LEV Leverage Long term debt divided by total assets 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
Q Tobin’s Q The sum of total liabilities plus market 
value of equity divided by book assets 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
LFACAMOUNT The log of the face value of the issued 
debt 
Equal to the log of the proceeds from the 
debt issuance in millions of USD 
Source: SDC for the bond sample and 
Dealscan for the loan sample 
SDEBTSIZE The face value of the issued debt divided 
by total assets 
Equal to the proceeds  from the debt 
issuance in millions of USD divided by 
total assets 
Source: SDC for the bond sample and 
Dealscan for the loan sample and 
COMPUSTAT 
SECURED Secured debt indicator An indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if the debt is secured and zero 
otherwise 
Source: SDC for the bond sample and 
Dealscan for the loan sample 
LMATURITY The log of the maturity of the issued debt The log of the time to maturity in months 
of the issued debt. 
Source: SDC for the bond sample and 
Dealscan for the loan sample 
COV_STRICTNESS Covenant strictness  A measure of covenant strictness based 
on Murfin (2010). Captures the ex-ante 
probability of covenants violation  
DLI The default likelihood indicator Based on Merton (1974) model and the 
calculation in Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
Source: COMPUSTAT, CRSP 
Z The negative of Altman (1968) Z Equals to negative 1 divided by total 
assets multiplied by the sum of the 
following five measures 3.3*earnings 
before income tax, 1*revenue, 1.4* 
retained earnings, 1.2*current assets net 
from current liabilities, 0.22* market 
value of equity.  
Source: COMPUSTAT, CRSP 
MTB Market to Book ratio Market value of equity divided by the 
book value of assets minus the book value 
of liabilities 
Source: COMPUSTAT, CRSP 
SPRATING S&P debt rating The S&P rating attached to the debt in the 
bond sample when available, or the S&P 
long term debt ratings in the loan sample 
when available. All ratings are converted 
to numeric values where AAA takes the 
value of 2 and defaulted debt takes the 
value of 27. 
Source: SDC for the bond sample and 
COMPUSTAT for the loan sample 
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Names of Variables Description Detailed Description and Source 
INV_GRADE Investment grade debt indicator An indicator variable that takes the value 
of one when the debt is above investment 
grade and zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC for the bond sample and 
COMPUSTAT for the loan sample 
SPRATED Rated by S&P indicator An indicator variable that takes the value 
of one for firms that have S&P rating and 
zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC for the bond sample and 
COMPUSTAT for the loan sample 
RELEVANCE RELEVANCE RELEVANCE is the R squared from the 
following regression, estimated for a 
firm-specific time series for firms with a 
maximum of 10 years and a minimum of 
4 years of available data before the debt 
issuance. RETit = 0 + 1* NIBEXit + 2* 
ΔNIBEXit+ 
 Where RET  is the cumulative return for 
the 15 months ended 3 months after the 
fiscal year end. NIBEX is net income 
before extraordinary items and ΔNIBEX 
is the change in net income before 
extraordinary items. 
Source: CRSP and  COMPUSTAT 
TIMELINESS TIMELINESS TIMELINESS is the R squared from the 
following regression, estimated for a 
firm-specific time series for firms with a 
maximum of 10 years and a minimum of 
5 years of available data before the debt 
issuance. 
NIBEXit = λ0 + λ1* Dit + λ 2* RETit + λ3* 
RETit *Dit+ 
Where RET  is the cumulative return for 
the 15 months ended 3 months after the 
fiscal year end. NIBEX is net income 
before extraordinary items. D is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
when RET is negative. 
CONSERVATISM CONSERVATISM TIMELINESS is the sum of λ 2 and λ 3 
divieded by λ2 from the following 
regression, estimated for a firm-specific 
time series for firms with a maximum of 
10 years and a minimum of 5 years of 
available data before the debt issuance. 
NIBEXit = λ0 + λ1* Dit + λ 2* RETit + λ3* 
RETit *Dit+ 
Where RET  is the cumulative return for 
the 15 months ended 3 months after the 
fiscal year end. NIBEX is net income 
before extraordinary items. D is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
when RET is negative. 
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Appendix B: Simple model of LGD and credit spreads 
The purpose of this model is to provide simple analytical intuition for the predictions 
presented in the paper and thus the model makes several assumptions that may not fully describe the 
contracting environment. The model starts with a borrower that has an investment opportunity to start 
a project that requires a fixed investment K at time zero. I assume debt is the optimal way to finance 
the project because of tax reasons, and the lender operates in a competitive industry. Both the 
borrower and the lender in this model are risk neutral. 
 I also assume that the project succeeds with probability (1-Pd) and fails (defaults) with 
probability Pd. If the project succeeds it yields a fixed rate of return, R, on the investment, and the 
lender gets interest payment of i for every $1 of its investment. If the project fails (with probability 
Pd) the borrower defaults on the loan and the borrower gets zero. The lender can recover rate of RR 
from its investment K where RR= (1-LGD). The recovery rate and thus LGD is between zero and 1. 
I also assume no agency problems exist, the borrower has no private benefit from the project 
other than the residual yield of R-i. There is also no information asymmetry between the lender and 
the borrower, and both have the same information about the parameters of the model. I also 
normalize the risk free rate to be zero, so i is the spread over the risk free rate.  
Case 1 – LGD is a known parameter: 
In this case the expected profit of the lender who competes in a competitive market is zero 
and is given by the following equation: 
 
 
This means that the interest rate i that the lender requires for providing funds to the borrower 
to compensate him for the risk is given by the following equation: 
 
 
E(πL) = (1-Pd)*(1+i)*K+Pd*(1-LGD)*K-K = 0 
 
(A1) 
i = ௉ௗ∗௅ீ஽(ଵି௉ௗ)  (A2) 
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The comparative static of this simple case yields the following implications. The credit 
spread, i, is increasing with LGD and Pd (the first derivatives of i with respect to LGD and Pd are 
positive). The sensitivity of the credit spread to LGD is increasing with Pd (the cross partial 
derivative with respect to LGD and then with respect to Pd is positive).  
Case 2 – LGD is a random variable on which financial statements provide a signal: 
In this case LGD is assumed to be a random variable distributed normally. LGD has a prior 
mean of  and a precision (1/variance) of h1.  can be thought of as all the other information 
available in the market that is not in the financial statements and that is informative about LGD, like 
industry classification, price movements, analysts ratings and reports, etc. 
 Before the debt contract is signed, the lender receives financial statements signal S from the 
borrower that is informative about LGD. S = LGD +   , where  is a noise term that is normally 
distributed with a mean zero and a precision (1/variance) of h2.  
In this case, the lender will require interest spread, i, that is given by an adjustment of 
equation (A2): 
 
 
Using Bayesian updating yields the following expression. 
 
 
 
The important comparative static from this simple case shows that the interest rate spread, i, 
is more sensitive to an accounting signal about LGD when S is more precise (the cross partial 
derivative with respect to S and then h2  is positive). 
 
i = ௉ௗ∗ா(௅ீ஽|ௌ)(ଵି௉ௗ)  (A3) 
i = 
௉ௗ∗
∗೓భశೄ∗೓మ(೓భశ೓మ)(ଵି௉ௗ)  
 
(A4) 
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Table 1- Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics presented below are taken from the three samples discussed above. Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistic for the DRS sample of defaulted bonds obtained from Moody’s DRS 
database. Panel B presents descriptive statistic for bond issuances obtained from SDC (bond sample). 
Panel C presents descriptive statistic for loan issuances obtained from Dealscan (bank loan sample). See 
Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. 
 
Panel A – DRS sample 
              
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
LGD 308 0.67 0.81 0.33 0.54 0.92 
ROA 308 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.09 
NET_WORTH 308 10.84 9.46 15.69 4.02 17.19 
INTANGIBLE_RATIO 308 2.57 0.25 10.10 0.00 0.97 
STTOLTDEBT 308 0.37 0.04 1.30 0.01 0.21 
LTA 308 7.43 7.64 1.50 6.46 8.57 
TIME TO DEFAULT 308 47.11 40.04 30.79 24.74 59.19 
 
 
Panel B – Bond Sample 
              
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
SPREAD 3,599 200.64 140.00 167.43 83.00 274.00 
PREDICT_LGD 3,599 0.69 0.68 0.14 0.61 0.78 
ROA 3,599 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.13 
INTANGIBLE_RATIO 3,599 0.82 0.15 2.50 0.00 0.70 
NET_WORTH 3,599 16.50 14.96 11.63 8.82 21.51 
STTOLTDEBT 3,599 0.29 0.12 0.75 0.03 0.31 
LTA 3,599 8.47 8.47 1.42 7.49 9.43 
LEV 3,599 0.30 0.28 0.17 0.19 0.38 
LSIZE 3,599 8.19 8.22 1.67 7.11 9.27 
Q 3,599 1.65 1.39 0.79 1.17 1.86 
LFACAMOUNT 3,599 4.98 5.30 1.43 4.61 5.86 
DLI 3,599 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 
Z 3,599 -1.64 -1.54 1.03 -2.30 -0.88 
SPRATING 3,556 9.00 9.00 3.69 6.00 12.00 
INV_GRADE 3,599 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
SPRATED 3,599 0.99 1.00 0.11 1.00 1.00 
LMATURITY 3,599 4.65 4.79 0.58 4.42 4.79 
MTB 3,599 3.33 2.07 23.06 1.45 3.31 
RELEVANCE 3,008 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.09 0.39 
TIMELINESS 2,949 0.36 0.34 0.23 0.17 0.53 
CONSERVATISM 2,949 -11.49 0.41 437.10 -3.41 3.29 
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Table 1- Descriptive Statistics – Cont. 
 
Panel C – Loan Sample 
 
            
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
SPREAD 13,325 183.46 152.14 137.09 75.00 262.50 
PREDICT_LGD 13,325 0.63 0.62 0.16 0.52 0.73 
ROA 13,325 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.12 
NET_WORTH 13,325 10.87 8.59 10.24 4.50 14.71 
INTANGIBLE_RATIO 13,325 1.27 0.27 3.76 0.01 1.04 
STTOLTDEBT 13,325 0.50 0.11 1.52 0.03 0.34 
LTA 13,325 6.44 6.40 1.93 5.08 7.77 
LEV 13,325 0.27 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.37 
LSIZE 13,325 6.10 6.09 2.08 4.60 7.56 
Q 13,325 1.60 1.34 1.00 1.08 1.79 
LFACAMOUNT 13,325 4.43 4.61 1.76 3.24 5.70 
DLI 13,325 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.01 
Z 13,325 -1.82 -1.80 1.28 -2.55 -1.05 
SPRATING 6,556 10.45 11.00 3.35 8.00 13.00 
INV_GRADE 13,325 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 
SPRATED 13,325 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
LMATURITY 13,325 3.67 3.87 0.65 3.22 4.09 
MTB 13,325 2.80 1.82 22.61 1.16 2.92 
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Table 2 - The relation between accounting measures at the debt issuance date and future LGD 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (1): 
LGD id = 0 + 1* ROAi,t-1 + 2* NET_WORTHi,t-1 + 3* INTANGIBLE_RATIOi,t-1 + 4* STTOLTDEBTi,t-1 + 5* 
LTAi,t-1 +6-22*ind +i 
The dependent variable, LGD equals to 1 minus the amount recovered by investors out of the face value 
of the defaulted debt. All other variables are described in Appendix A. 
 
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  
LGD 
 
LGD 
 
LGD 
ROA -0.907* 
 
-0.781* 
  
(4.88) 
   
(4.11) 
NET_WORTH -0.005* 
 
-0.004* 
  
(3.94) 
   
(2.79) 
INTANGIBLE_RATIO 0.003* 
 
0.003* 
  
(5.04) 
   
(4.17) 
STTOLTDEBT 0.018* 
 
0.025* 
  
(2.79) 
   
(2.71) 
LTA 0.063* 
 
0.062* 
  
(5.83) 
   
(5.07) 
Constant 0.292* 0.736* 0.288* 
  
(3.57) 
 
(30.22) 
 
(3.08) 
Observations 
 
308 
 
308 
 
308 
R-squared 
 
0.18 
 
0.165 
 
0.276 
       Fixed effects 
 
No 
 
Ind 
 
Ind 
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Table 3- The relation between PREDICT_LGD and SPREAD 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (3): 
SPREAD it = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Xi,t-1 + ++ 
The dependent variable, SPREAD it is the credit spread over the treasury benchmark. PREDICT_LGDi  is a 
measure of expected LGD at the debt issuance date. t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors by 
firm. All other variables are described in Appendix A.  
 
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
436.613* 
   
415.947* 
  
(8.80) 
   
(9.09) 
ACC_PREDICT_LGD 
  
436.613* 
  
    
(8.80) 
  LSIZE 
 
-53.005* 
 
-53.005* 
 
-61.579* 
  
(15.46) 
 
(15.46) 
 
(18.12) 
LEV 
 
40.339 
 
40.339 
 
35.658 
  
(1.08) 
 
(1.08) 
 
(1.04) 
Q 
 
20.135* 
 
20.135* 
 
16.951* 
  
(4.29) 
 
(4.29) 
 
(4.03) 
LFACAMOUNT 
 
21.670* 
 
21.670* 
 
12.717* 
  
(8.63) 
 
(8.63) 
 
(7.30) 
LMATURITY 
 
-8.316** 
 
-8.316** 
 
13.528* 
  
(2.05) 
 
(2.05) 
 
(4.09) 
SECURED 
 
142.652* 
 
142.652* 
 
134.436* 
  
(4.79) 
 
(4.79) 
 
(4.50) 
INV_GRADE 
 
-142.610* 
 
-142.610* 
 
-121.872* 
  
(16.22) 
 
(16.22) 
 
(13.01) 
SPRATED 
 
69.214** 
 
69.214** 
 
53.481 
  
(2.09) 
 
(2.09) 
 
(1.55) 
Constant 
 
245.058* 
 
370.792* 
 
235.921* 
  
(4.74) 
 
(7.69) 
 
(4.96) 
Observations 
 
3,599 
 
3,599 
 
3,599 
R-squared 
 
0.557 
 
0.557 
 
0.662 
        Fixed effects 
 
Ind 
 
Ind 
 
Ind,Year 
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Table 4 - The relation between PREDICT_LGD and SPREAD over and above default likelihood 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (3) and includes additional control variables 
for the probability of default. 
SPREAD it = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Xi,t-1 + ++ 
The dependent variable, SPREAD it is the credit spread over the treasury benchmark. PREDICT_LGDi  is a 
measure of expected LGD at the debt issuance date. t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors by 
firm. All other variables are described in Appendix A.  
 
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
365.200* 
 
401.437* 
 
316.908* 
 
268.191* 
 
250.195* 
  
(7.40) 
 
(7.67) 
 
(7.45) 
 
(4.84) 
 
(6.22) 
LSIZE 
 
-59.216* 
 
-61.211* 
 
-43.402* 
 
-41.145* 
 
-36.947* 
  
(16.21) 
 
(18.17) 
 
(12.02) 
 
(9.97) 
 
(11.27) 
LEV 
 
27.377 
 
30.463 
 
-19.28 
 
-26.781 
 
-38.742 
  
(0.79) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(0.55) 
 
(0.68) 
 
(1.23) 
Q 
 
16.127* 
 
17.435* 
 
20.279* 
 
19.266* 
 
7.082*** 
  
(3.68) 
 
(4.12) 
 
(4.93) 
 
(4.65) 
 
(1.90) 
LFACAMOUNT 
 
12.920* 
 
12.697* 
 
7.429* 
 
7.681* 
 
10.206* 
  
(7.31) 
 
(7.26) 
 
(3.06) 
 
(2.99) 
 
(5.15) 
LMATURITY 
 
14.156* 
 
13.465* 
 
17.350* 
 
17.979* 
 
15.987* 
  
(4.32) 
 
(4.06) 
 
(5.33) 
 
(5.56) 
 
(5.67) 
SECURED 
 
121.033* 
 
133.678* 
 
128.617* 
 
115.978* 
 
103.400* 
  
(4.31) 
 
(4.49) 
 
(4.19) 
 
(4.05) 
 
(3.41) 
INV_GRADE 
 
-120.439* 
 
-121.691* 
      
  
(12.79) 
 
(12.94) 
      SPRATED 
 
49.163 
 
54.539 
      
  
(1.42) 
 
(1.58) 
      DLI 
 
105.204* 
     
107.452* 
  
  
(3.56) 
     
(3.31) 
  Z 
   
3.689 
   
-0.818 
  
    
(0.61) 
   
(0.13) 
  SPRATING 
     
24.069* 
 
23.883* 
  
      
(17.04) 
 
(16.39) 
  Constant 
 
249.531* 
 
248.429* 
 
-45.324 
 
-35.639 
 
66.462** 
  
(5.23) 
 
(4.36) 
 
(1.28) 
 
(0.71) 
 
(2.18) 
Observations 
 
3,599 
 
3,599 
 
3,556 
 
3,556 
 
3,556 
R-squared 
 
0.666 
 
0.662 
 
0.694 
 
0.699 
 
0.735 
            Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year,SPRATING 
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Table 5- The effects of default likelihood on the relation between PREDICT_LGD and SPREAD 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (3) of a sample partitioned to high and low likelihood of default subsamples. 
SPREAD it = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Xi,t-1 + ++ 
The dependent variable, SPREAD it is the credit spread over the treasury benchmark. PREDICT_LGDi  is a measure of expected LGD at the debt 
issuance date. t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors by firm. The P-values of the differences between (1) and (2) groups in each model 
are based on Monte-Carlo non-parametric simulation. All other variables are described in Appendix A.  
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
  
LOW DLI HIGH DLI 
 
LOW Z  HIGH Z 
 
Below 
INV_GRADE 
Above 
INV_GRADE 
  
SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
PREDICT_LGD 154.803** 625.748* 
 
366.068* 626.166* 
 
498.489* 101.476* 
  
(2.35) (8.51) 
 
(5.55) (7.27) 
 
(7.05) (2.88) 
LSIZE -44.475* -94.699* 
 
-75.332* -82.716* 
 
-87.573* -19.888* 
  
(8.52) (20.59) 
 
(16.78) (16.26) 
 
(16.19) (7.45) 
LEV 89.547* 93.056** 
 
55.726*** 167.451* 
 
19.328 17.086 
  
(2.80) (2.21) 
 
(1.83) (3.51) 
 
(0.46) (0.85) 
Q 2.464 37.839* 
 
7.183 38.501* 
 
32.262* -9.502* 
  
(0.45) (4.74) 
 
(1.26) (4.89) 
 
(3.99) (2.78) 
LFACAMOUNT 9.202* 13.776** 
 
15.060* 11.634** 
 
15.098* 6.458* 
  
(4.06) (2.05) 
 
(4.94) (2.32) 
 
(3.35) (3.55) 
LMATURITY 16.226* 10.836 
 
18.457* 2.984 
 
-8.094 20.614* 
  
(5.94) (1.51) 
 
(5.45) (0.44) 
 
(0.68) (9.95) 
SECURED 15.719 102.646* 
 
86.624 113.805* 
 
146.250* -32.311 
  
(0.39) (3.24) 
 
(1.49) (3.48) 
 
(4.93) (1.34) 
Constant 
 
199.335* 285.112* 
 
315.101* 167.361** 
 
478.211* 60.031* 
  
(5.25) (4.45) 
 
(7.08) (2.45) 
 
(5.64) (2.82) 
Observations 
 
1,800 1,799 
 
1,800 1,799 
 
1,373 2,226 
R-squared 
 
0.484 0.563 
 
0.615 0.579 
 
0.482 0.552 
          Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year Ind,Year 
          diff of PREDICT_LGD (1)-(2) 
 
-470.95 
 
-266.10 
 
397.01 
P-VALUE of diff of PREDICT_LGD (1)-(2) 
 
<0.01 
 
<0.01 
 
<0.01 
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Table 6 - The effects of managerial entrenchment on the relation between PREDICT_LGD and 
SPREAD  
This table presents the results of the estimation of a variation of Equation (3) and includes additional control 
variables for the probability of default. 
SPREAD it = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Xi,t-1 + ++ 
The sample is partitioned based on the median of EINDEX, which is the entrenchment index from Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2008).The dependent variable, SPREAD it is the credit spread over the treasury 
benchmark. PREDICT_LGDi  is a measure of expected LGD at the debt issuance date. t-statistics are based on 
clustered standard errors by firm. The P-values of the differences between (1) and (2) groups in each model 
are based on Monte-Carlo non-parametric simulation. All other variables are described in Appendix A.  
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
  
(1) (2) 
  
LOW EINDEX HIGH EINDEX 
  
SPREAD 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
178.620** 378.514* 
  
(2.44) (3.00) 
LSIZE 
 
-39.638* -46.337* 
  
(6.64) (5.08) 
LEV 
 
-0.106 4.841 
  
0.00  (0.09) 
Q 
 
-1.122 23.853** 
  
(0.15) (2.11) 
LFACAMOUNT 
 
8.303*** 4.461 
  
(1.84) (1.17) 
LMATURITY 
 
16.484** 7.994 
  
(2.51) (0.91) 
SECURED 
 
9.466 160.704*** 
  
(0.10) (1.66) 
INV_GRADE 
 
-109.899* -133.896* 
  
(6.15) (6.31) 
DLI 
 
300.138** 168.6 
  
(2.42) (1.05) 
Z 
 
7.365 0.192 
  
(0.85) (0.03) 
Constant 
 
333.252* 289.129* 
  
(5.62) (3.22) 
Observations 
 
825 488 
R-squared 
 
0.57  0.61  
     Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year Ind,Year 
    diff of PREDICT_LGD (1)-(2) 
 
-199.90 
P-VALUE of diff of PREDICT_LGD (1)-(2) <0.05 
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Table 7- The relation between PREDICT_LGD and SECURED 
This table presents the results of the logit estimation of Equation (4): 
Prob(SECURED)it = 0 + 1*PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Ci,t-1 + ++ 
The dependent variable, SECURED  is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bond is secured. 
PREDICT_LGDi  is a measure of expected LGD at the debt issuance date. z-statistics are based on clustered 
standard errors by firm. All other variables are described in Appendix A.  
 
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  
SECURED SECURED SECURED 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
12.934* 
 
9.148* 
 
13.218* 
  
(5.40) 
 
(3.65) 
 
(5.01) 
LSIZE 
 
-1.029* 
 
-0.878* 
 
-1.108* 
  
(4.42) 
 
(3.67) 
 
(4.18) 
LEV 
 
0.209 
 
-0.666 
 
0.598 
  
(0.22) 
 
(0.58) 
 
(0.62) 
Q 
 
0.116 
 
0.171 
 
0.282 
  
(0.34) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(1.12) 
LFACAMOUNT 
 
-0.068 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.116 
  
(0.45) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.75) 
LMATURITY 
 
0.317 
 
0.283 
 
0.445 
  
(0.62) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(0.81) 
SPREAD 
 
0.003** 
 
0.003** 
 
0.003*** 
  
(2.06) 
 
(2.22) 
 
(1.79) 
INV_GRADE 
 
0.741 
 
0.725 
  
  
(1.18) 
 
(1.16) 
  SPRATED 
 
-0.679 
 
-0.662 
  
  
(0.92) 
 
(0.87) 
  DLI 
   
0.907 
  
    
(1.20) 
  Z 
   
0.706* 
  
    
(2.62) 
  SPRATING 
     
-0.116 
      
(1.15) 
Constant 
 
-8.596* 
 
-6.110** 
 
-7.885** 
  
(3.24) 
 
(2.13) 
 
(2.45) 
Observations 
 
3,194 
 
3,194 
 
3,156 
       Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
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Table 8- The relation between PREDICT_LGD and time to Maturity 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (5): 
LMATURITY it = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Pi,t-1 + ++ 
The dependent variable, LMATURITY it is the natural log of the time to maturity of the bond in months. 
PREDICT_LGDi  is a measure of expected LGD at the debt issuance date. t-statistics are based on clustered 
standard errors by firm. All other variables are described in Appendix A.  
 
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  
LMATURITY LMATURITY LMATURITY 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
-0.758* 
 
-0.710* 
 
-0.680* 
  
(3.52) 
 
(2.95) 
 
(3.09) 
LSIZE 
 
0.01 
 
0.008 
 
-0.01 
  
(0.57) 
 
(0.45) 
 
(0.55) 
LEV 
 
0 
 
0.002 
 
0.08 
  
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.99) 
Q 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.041*** 
  
(1.54) 
 
(1.47) 
 
(1.79) 
LFACAMOUNT 
 
0.056* 
 
0.055* 
 
0.059* 
  
(4.23) 
 
(4.18) 
 
(4.76) 
SECURED 
 
-0.044 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.049 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.42) 
SPREAD 
 
0.000* 
 
0.000* 
 
0.001* 
  
(3.58) 
 
(3.75) 
 
(4.32) 
INV_GRADE 
 
0.087*** 
 
0.087*** 
  
  
(1.89) 
 
(1.95) 
  SPRATED 
 
0.246* 
 
0.255* 
  
  
(2.77) 
 
(2.92) 
  DLI 
   
-0.192** 
  
    
(2.43) 
  Z 
   
0.009 
  
    
(0.51) 
  SPRATING 
     
-0.029* 
      
(3.93) 
Constant 
 
4.630* 
 
4.623* 
 
5.237* 
  
(26.22) 
 
(24.09) 
 
(28.86) 
Observations 
 
3,599 
 
3,599 
 
3,556 
R-squared 
 
0.144 
 
0.146 
 
0.153 
       Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
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Table 9- The relation between PREDICT_LGD and debt size 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (6): 
SDEBTSIZEit = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Ei,t-1 + ++ 
The dependent variable, SDEBTSIZEit is the ratio of the face value of the debt to the borrower’s total assets. 
PREDICT_LGDi  is a measure of expected LGD at the debt issuance date. t-statistics are based on clustered 
standard errors by firm. All other variables are described in Appendix A.  
 
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  
SDEBTSIZE SDEBTSIZE SDEBTSIZE 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
-0.202** 
 
-0.246* 
 
-0.214** 
  
(2.50) 
 
(2.77) 
 
(2.50) 
LSIZE 
 
-0.042* 
 
-0.042* 
 
-0.039* 
  
(6.28) 
 
(6.46) 
 
(5.45) 
LEV 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.38) 
 
(0.95) 
 
(1.25) 
Q 
 
0.056* 
 
0.060* 
 
0.058* 
  
(4.98) 
 
(4.87) 
 
(4.89) 
LMATURITY 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.004 
  
(1.46) 
 
(1.75) 
 
(0.97) 
SECURED 
 
0.014 
 
0.021 
 
0.033 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.56) 
SPREAD 
 
0.000* 
 
0.000* 
 
0.000* 
  
(4.06) 
 
(4.16) 
 
(3.78) 
INV_GRADE 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
  
  
(0.20) 
 
(0.11) 
  SPRATED 
 
0.036 
 
0.046*** 
  
  
(1.51) 
 
(1.93) 
  DLI 
   
-0.099* 
  
    
(3.32) 
  Z 
   
0.022* 
  
    
(2.70) 
  SPRATING 
     
0.006* 
      
(3.02) 
Constant 
 
0.422* 
 
0.482* 
 
0.398* 
  
(9.09) 
 
(7.74) 
 
(8.39) 
Observations 
 
3,599 
 
3,599 
 
3,556 
R-squared 
 
0.33  
 
0.34  
 
0.33  
       Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
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Table 10- The effect of the precision of the accounting signal on the relation between PREDICT_LGD and SPREAD 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (3) of a sample partitioned to high and low accounting system qualities subsamples. 
SPREAD it = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Xi,t-1 + ++ 
The dependent variable, SPREAD it is the credit spread over the treasury benchmark. PREDICT_LGDi  is a measure of expected LGD at the debt 
issuance date. t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors by firm. The P-values of the differences between (1) and (2) groups in each model 
are based on Monte-Carlo non-parametric simulation. All other variables are described in Appendix A.  
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
  
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
  
LOW 
RELEVANCE 
HIGH 
RELEVANCE 
 
LOW 
TIMELINES 
High 
TIMELINES 
 
LOW 
CONSERVATISM 
High 
CONSERVATISM 
  
SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
210.837* 374.304* 
 
153.971** 469.794* 
 
376.212* 190.414* 
  
(2.69) (5.53) 
 
(2.07) (6.51) 
 
(4.74) (2.62) 
LSIZE 
 
-42.159* -61.353* 
 
-41.780* -64.658* 
 
-65.103* -39.746* 
  
(7.83) (11.56) 
 
(8.29) (11.20) 
 
(11.42) (7.76) 
LEV 
 
-50.476 109.97 
 
-33.113 85.184 
 
51.09 -1.026 
  
(1.39) (1.34) 
 
(0.89) (1.00) 
 
(0.71) (0.03) 
Q 
 
-3.57 21.854* 
 
-3.887 20.568* 
 
21.310* -3.858 
  
(0.58) (3.13) 
 
(0.67) (2.86) 
 
(3.09) (0.63) 
LFACAMOUNT 
 
11.478* 11.037* 
 
16.805* 9.823* 
 
15.085* 7.758* 
  
(4.70) (3.59) 
 
(4.85) (4.09) 
 
(6.69) (2.68) 
LMATURITY 
 
13.710* 11.927* 
 
14.779* 18.475* 
 
17.958* 12.589* 
  
(4.10) (2.68) 
 
(3.99) (3.98) 
 
(3.85) (3.29) 
SECURED 
 
90.784*** 95.876** 
 
84.931*** 29.71 
 
107.377 60.341 
  
(1.74) (2.20) 
 
(1.91) (0.42) 
 
(1.25) (1.38) 
INV_GRADE 
 
-129.495* -110.579* 
 
-125.894* -107.190* 
 
-110.942* -121.325* 
  
(10.47) (8.04) 
 
(8.67) (7.96) 
 
(8.19) (9.08) 
SPRATED 
 
93.199** 137.630* 
 
129.840** 100.520* 
 
170.365* 76.347** 
  
(2.01) (3.22) 
 
(2.48) (3.30) 
 
(3.39) (2.02) 
DLI 
 
355.885* 43.145 
 
291.082* 56.735 
 
86.094 228.489* 
  
(8.06) (1.21) 
 
(5.81) (1.16) 
 
(1.52) (4.58) 
Z 
 
3.575 -1.446 
 
2.853 0.091 
 
-1.988 7.793 
  
(0.47) (0.19) 
 
(0.37) (0.01) 
 
(0.22) (1.04) 
Constant 
 
216.789* 165.214** 
 
182.390** 132.191*** 
 
76.843 268.144* 
  
(3.03) (2.37) 
 
(2.50) (1.85) 
 
(0.93) (4.37) 
Observations 
 
1,504 1,504 
 
1,469 1,480 
 
1,476 1,473 
R-squared 
 
0.656 0.654 
 
0.637 0.651 
 
0.615 0.672 
          Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year Ind,Year 
          diff of PREDICT_LGD (1)-(2) 
 
-163.46 
 
-315.83 
 
185.80 
P-VALUE of diff of PREDICT_LGD (1)-(2) 
 
<0.01 
 
<0.01 
 
<0.01 
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Table 11- The relation between PREDICT_LGD and loan contract characteristics 
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of equation (3),(5) and a variation of equation (6): 
SPREADit = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi t-1+ 2* Xi,t-1 + ++ (3) 
LMATURITYit = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Pi,t-1 + ++ (5) 
LSDEBTSIZEit = 0 + 1* PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Ei,t-1 + ++ (6) 
And logit estimation of Equation (4): 
Prob(SECURED)it = 0 + 1*PREDICT_LGDi,t-1+ 2* Ci,t-1 + ++ (4) 
Panel A presents the results of these estimations without controlling for financial covenant strictness. 
Panel B controls for financial covenant strictness and presents the results of the estimation of the effects 
of PREDICT_LGD on covenant strictness. The dependent variable, SPREAD it is the credit spread of the 
loan over the Libor. The dependent variable, SECURED is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if the loan is secured. The dependent variable, LMATURITY it is the natural log of the time to maturity 
of the loan in months. The dependent variable, LSDEBTSIZEit is the natural log of the face value of the 
debt divided by the borrower’s total assets. PREDICT_LGDi  is a measure of expected LGD at the debt 
issuance date. t-statistics and z-statistics are based on clustered standard errors by firm. All other 
variables are described in Appendix A.  
Panel A –without controlling for financial covenant strictness  
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
  
SPREAD 
 
SECURED 
 
LMATURITY LSDEBTSIZE 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
195.404* 
 
0.872** 
 
-0.968* 
 
-1.496* 
  
(11.24) 
 
(2.01) 
 
(9.70) 
 
(7.13) 
LSIZE 
 
-27.736* 
 
-0.389* 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.224* 
  
(14.59) 
 
(8.50) 
 
(1.10) 
 
(7.38) 
LEV 
 
49.829* 
 
-0.135 
 
0.334* 
 
0.086 
  
(4.88) 
 
(0.67) 
 
(8.08) 
 
(0.90) 
Q 
 
4.908* 
 
0.180* 
 
-0.024** 
 
0.162* 
  
(4.01) 
 
(4.49) 
 
(2.42) 
 
(5.17) 
SPREAD 
   
0.007* 
 
0 
 
-0.002* 
    
(12.90) 
 
0.00  
 
(7.27) 
LFACAMOUNT 
 
-14.116* 
 
0.087** 
 
0.096* 
  
 
(8.44) 
 
(2.46) 
 
(10.70) 
  LMATURITY 
 
-0.009 
 
0.480* 
   
0.268* 
  
0.00  
 
(9.44) 
   
(10.25) 
SECURED 
 
58.589* 
   
0.151* 
 
0.077** 
  
(17.73) 
   
(9.98) 
 
(2.38) 
INV_GRADE 
 
-50.018* 
 
-1.517* 
 
-0.306* 
 
-0.032 
  
(11.44) 
 
(9.64) 
 
(10.73) 
 
(0.56) 
SPRATED 
 
28.016* 
 
0.407* 
 
0.086* 
 
0.085*** 
  
(6.64) 
 
(4.66) 
 
(3.95) 
 
(1.70) 
DLI 
 
48.912* 
 
-0.539** 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.378* 
  
(4.83) 
 
(2.25) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(4.69) 
Z 
 
7.227* 
 
0.109* 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.004 
  
(5.04) 
 
(3.30) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.26) 
Constant 
 
264.004* 
 
-1.582* 
 
4.000* 
 
-1.115* 
  
(16.69) 
 
(4.44) 
 
(50.62) 
 
(4.03) 
Observations 
 
13,325 
 
13,325 
 
13,325 
 
13,325 
R-squared 
 
0.501 
   
0.196 
 
0.285 
         Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
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Table 11- Cont. 
Panel B –controlling for financial covenant strictness and the effects of PREDICT_LGD on loan 
financial covenant strictness  
*** Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 1% level 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
  
SPREAD 
 
SECURED 
 
LMATURITY SDEBTSIZE 
COV 
STRICTNESS 
PREDICT_LGD 
 
224.727* 
 
1.305*** 
 
-0.864* 
 
-0.317* 
 
0.734* 
  
(8.18) 
 
(1.65) 
 
(5.53) 
 
(3.43) 
 
(6.89) 
LSIZE 
 
-28.640* 
 
-0.453* 
 
-0.025*** 
 
-0.044* 
 
-0.039* 
  
(12.40) 
 
(5.56) 
 
(1.77) 
 
(3.86) 
 
(4.11) 
LEV 
 
57.226* 
 
0.587 
 
0.355* 
 
0.039 
 
0.428* 
  
(3.95) 
 
(1.42) 
 
(5.47) 
 
(0.91) 
 
(8.78) 
Q 
 
11.525* 
 
0.107 
 
-0.019 
 
0.047* 
 
-0.019*** 
  
(5.71) 
 
(1.49) 
 
(1.26) 
 
(4.54) 
 
(1.91) 
SPREAD 
   
0.011* 
 
0.000 
 
-0.000* 
 
0.000*** 
    
(7.70) 
 
(1.17) 
 
(5.22) 
 
(1.88) 
SECURED 
 
51.108* 
   
0.169* 
 
0.005 
 
-0.023 
  
(11.12) 
   
(7.46) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(1.45) 
LMATURITY 
 
3.473 
 
0.677* 
   
0.070* 
 
-0.041* 
  
(1.17) 
 
(6.97) 
   
(8.03) 
 
(3.95) 
LFACAMOUNT 
 
-15.230* 
 
0.01 
 
0.115* 
   
0.011*** 
 
(7.76) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(10.69) 
   
(1.71) 
COV 
STRICTNESS 
 
11.971*** 
 
-0.341** 
 
-0.117* 
 
0.048*** 
  
  
(1.83) 
 
(1.97) 
 
(3.92) 
 
(1.90) 
  INV_GRADE 
 
-48.346* 
 
-1.551* 
 
-0.292* 
 
-0.028** 
 
0.046*** 
  
(8.65) 
 
(6.10) 
 
(8.21) 
 
(2.16) 
 
(1.75) 
SPRATED 
 
29.481* 
 
0.415* 
 
0.132* 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.023 
  
(4.19) 
 
(2.62) 
 
(4.91) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(1.06) 
DLI 
 
63.792* 
 
-0.214 
 
-0.197** 
 
-0.104* 
 
-0.043 
  
(3.41) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(2.51) 
 
(3.31) 
 
(0.74) 
Z 
 
6.898* 
 
0.087 
 
-0.002 
 
0.007 
 
0.015** 
  
(3.27) 
 
(1.50) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(1.00) 
 
(2.17) 
Constant 
 
183.529* 
 
-1.670** 
 
3.831* 
 
0.447* 
 
0.201** 
  
(8.54) 
 
(2.54) 
 
(37.45) 
 
(5.76) 
 
(2.44) 
Observations 
 
4,584 
 
4,584 
 
4,584 
 
4,584 
 
4,584 
R-squared 
 
0.559 
   
0.262 
 
0.139 
 
0.262 
           Fixed effects 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
 
Ind,Year 
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